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Abstract 
 
Armed forces the world over have three primary functions — force development, force 
deployment and force employment.  Defence policy plays a guiding role in all of these, but is 
especially important in establishing the rationale for the creation of those military capabilities 
that force development brings about.  The end of the Cold War, which coincided with a new 
political dispensation in South Africa, also gave rise to a new security paradigm:  a theory 
implying both a reduction in the utility of military force, and an adjustment in the use of 
military forces.  This phenomenon changed the context within which states generate modern 
defence policy, but did not affect the causal relationship between policy publications and the 
outcomes of a military’s force development activities.  Usually, a defence policy presupposes 
the development of armed forces that are effective and efficient at executing their mandate — 
a condition that is measurable in terms of the organisation’s levels integration, skill, quality and 
responsiveness.  The thesis uses this concept, both as a point of departure and as a structural 
organising device, to describe the variance between defence policy and military capabilities.  A 
general analysis of South Africa’s defence policy publications indicates that, indeed, the 
policymakers had thoroughly considered the armed forces’ effectiveness when they wrote the 
White Paper (1996) and the Defence Review (1998).  By 2006, the South African Army has 
interpreted national defence policy and formulated a future strategy of its own, very much in 
alignment with the ‘modern system’ approach of the original policy publications.   
 
However, further analysis of the actual capabilities of the South African National Defence Force 
indicates a major variance between the relevant defence policy publications, the military’s 
force development outcomes, and the present demands of the South African security 
environment.  There appears to be quite serious deficiencies in the attribute of integration, 
which arise primarily from political influences; furthermore, the military’s quality is under 
strain, mainly because of the defence force’s seeming inability to formulate a strategy that is 
not only acceptable, but also suitable and feasible.  While the armed forces appear to be skilful 
enough to execute their present (peacetime) missions, success in the type of operations that 
policy demands is unlikely.  In summary, the study suggests that the principal reason for the 
large variance between defence policy, military capabilities, and real operational demands 
stems from defence’s lack of responsiveness to its resource constraints and operational 
realities.  The thesis therefore concludes that the defence force has been largely unsuccessful in 
complying with the demands of defence policy, irrespective of the fact that the policy by itself 
may be obsolete and/or inappropriate for the South African context; furthermore, that military 
effectiveness in meeting current operational demands is also doubtful.  Finally, the defence 
force’s schizophrenic organisational culture may be the primary cause of it moving ever closer 
to reneging on its constitutional mandate.   
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Opsomming 
 
Gewapende magte wêreldwyd het drie primêre funksies — magsontwikkeling, magsontplooiing 
en magsaanwending.  Verdedigingsbeleid vervul ‘n rigtinggewende rol in al hierdie funksies, 
maar is veral belangrik om die skepping van die militêre vermoëns, wat deur 
magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite daargestel word, te regverdig.  Gevolglik beoog hierdie tesis om 
die mate van ooreenkoms tussen die voorskrifte van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleid en die 
werklike militêre vermoëns van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag te beskryf, soos dit 
ontwikkel het tussen 2000 en 2011.  Die einde van die Koue Oorlog (samelopend met die 
totstandkoming van ‘n nuwe bedeling in Suid-Afrika) het geboorte gegee aan nuwe denke 
betreffende veiligheid, wat ook ‘n afname in die nuttigheid van militêre mag en ‘n aanpassing in 
die aanwending van militêre magte tot gevolg gehad het.  Hierdie verskynsel het die omgewing 
waarbinne moderne state verdedigingsbeleid ontwikkel verander, maar nie die kousale verband 
tussen beleidspublikasies en die uitkomste van ‘n weermag se magsontwikkelingsaktiwiteite 
aangeraak nie.  Gewoonlik veronderstel ‘n verdedigingsbeleid die ontwikkeling van gewapende 
magte wat doeltreffend en doelmatig is in die uitvoering van hul mandaat — ‘n toestand wat 
meetbaar is in terme van die organisasie se vlakke van integrasie, vaardigheid, kwaliteit, en hul 
vermoë om toepaslik op omgewigsinvloede te reageer.  Die tesis gebruik hierdie konsep, beide 
as ‘n vertrekpunt en as ‘n strukturele ordeningsmeganisme, en om die verskille tussen 
verdedigingsbeleid en militêre vermoëns te beskryf.  ‘n Algemene ontleding van Suid-Afrika se 
verdedigingsbeleidspublikasies toon dat, met die skryf van die Witskrif (1996) en 
Verdedigingsoorsig (1998), beleidmakers wel deeglike oorweging geskenk het aan die weermag 
se doeltreffenheid; so ook die Suid-Afrikaanse Leër, wat teen 2006 sy eie toekomsstrategie die 
lig laat sien het.   
 
Desnieteenstaande getuig verdere ontleding van die Suid-Afrikaanse Nasional Weermag se 
werklike vermoëns van diepgaande verskille tussen verbandhoudende beleidspublikasies, die 
weermag se ontwikkelingsuitkomste, en die huidige eise van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
veiligheidsomgewing.  Dit wil voorkom asof daar ernstige integrasie-leemtes is, komende 
hoofsaaklik vanuit die politieke omgewing; verder is die gewapende magte se kwaliteit onder 
druk, hoofsaaklik vanweë die weermag se onvermoë om ‘n strategie te formuleer wat 
gelyktydig aanvaarbaar, geskik en uitvoerbaar is.  Die gewapende magte mag dalk vaardig 
genoeg wees om hul huidige (vredestydse) take te verrig, maar dit is te betwyfel of hulle 
suksesvol sal wees in die voer van die tipe operasies soos beleid voorgeskryf.  Ter opsomming 
dui die studie aan dat die groot verskille tussen verdedigingsbeleid, militêre vermoëns en 
werklike operasionel eise voor die deur van ‘n gebrek aan doelmatige aanpassing by 
hulpbrontekorte en operasionele werklikhede gelê kan word.  Die tesis maak dus die 
gevolgtrekking dat die weermag grootliks onsuksesvol was om aan die vereistes van 
verdedigingsbeleid te voldoen, ongeag die feit dat verdedigingsbeleid op sigself verouderderd 
en/of ontoepaslik binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks mag wees; verder, dat militêre 
effektiwiteit ter voldoening aan huidige operasionele eise tans ook verdag is.  Ten slotte is die 
weermag se tweeslagtige organisasiekultuur moontlik die belangrikste oorsaak van die neiging 
na die versaking van verdediging se grondwetlike mandaat. 
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Politics is war without bloodshed 
while war is politics with bloodshed 
Mao Tse-Tung, 1893 — 1976. 
 
 
War is much too serious a matter 
to be entrusted to the military 
Georges Clemenceau, 1841 — 1992. 
 
 
I have come to the conclusion that politics are too serious a matter 
to be left to the politicians 
Charles de Gaulle, 1890 — 1970. 
 
 
The whole art of politics 
consists in directing rationally the irrationalities of men 
Reinhold Niebuhr, 1892 — 1971. 
 
 
Politics, n. “Strife of interests masquerading as a contest of principles” 
Ambrose Bierce, 1842 — 1914, The Devil’s Dictionary. 
 
 
You cannot simultaneously prevent and prepare for war 
Albert Einstein, 1879 — 1955. 
 
 
Luck in the long run 
is given only to the efficient 
Helmuth Von Moltke, 1800 — 1891. 
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Key Terms 
 
Term Definition 
Attrition Warfare A doctrine or approach to the conduct of war that emphasizes the general, 
systematic destruction of an opponent, aimed at diminishing the adversary’s 
material power to resist over time, through the application of superior force. 
ANC African National Congress:  a revolutionary movement turned political party, and 
having the majority in South African parliament since 1994. 
Capability The capacity to execute a specified course of action, usually expressed in terms 
of the means and competencies to do so.  A capability may, or may not, be 
accompanied by an intention. 
Cold War A state of tension between adversaries in which measures, short of sustained 
action by regular forces, are used to attain national objectives.  These measures 
may include political, economic, technological, sociological, paramilitary, and 
small-scale military efforts.  The term ‘Cold War’ is commonly used to describe 
relations between the United States and the USSR from the late 1940s until the 
late 1990s.  
Collateral Damage Damage to areas not specifically targeted, caused by the effects of weapon 
strikes extending beyond the immediate area of the target. 
Compellence The process of influencing, through one instrument or a variety of instruments, 
another party either to initiate or to cease some specified action, which would 
not otherwise have been taken.  Compellence is positive in nature, while 
deterrence is negative. 
Conflict Spectrum A continuum of hostilities that ranges from sub-crisis manoeuvring in 
containment, compellence, or deterrence situations, to the most violent form of 
general war. 
Containment Formerly, it was the United States’ policy to prevent communism from 
spreading; after the end of the Cold War, any policy to prevent armed violence 
from spreading. 
Contingency Plans; - 
Operations 
Preparation for major events that can reasonably be anticipated and that 
probably will have a detrimental effect on national security objectives; actions in 
case such events occur. 
Conventional (or  
Regular) War  
Military operations conducted among the regular forces of states, employing 
mainly heavy weapons in force-on-force combat, and using standard doctrine.  
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Term Definition 
Defence Policy The authoritative allocation of values for the national defence community, 
designed to give direction, coherence, and continuity to courses of action for 
which the decision-making body is responsible.  Public policy could be 
proclaimed in law and then it would be authoritative and enforceable, or it could 
be issued as guidelines in which case it would be an imperative but not legally 
enforceable. 
Deterrence Measures taken to prevent aggression by opponents and to inhibit escalation if 
combat occurs; the prevention from action by fear of the consequences; a state 
of mind produced by one’s perception of a threat of unacceptable counteraction 
by an opponent.  
DOD South African Department of Defence and Military Veterans 
Escalation Intensification or broadening of a conflict through the use of more powerful 
weapons, larger number of forces, or geographic spread of the conflict. 
Force Deployment Placing developed military forces appropriately in time and space 
Force Development Establishing and enhancing organisational structures, equipment, doctrine, 
training and other preparations to execute military missions 
Force Employment Executing military missions 
Graduated Response The incremental application of national power to meet a security threat, 
allowing for gradual escalation and accommodation of each element of power.  
Guerrilla Warfare A doctrine or approach to the conduct of war that entails military and 
paramilitary operations in hostile territory, executed by irregular forces 
employing mainly light weapons and using hit-and-run tactics.  
Infrastructure Generally used for all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications, facilities or 
communication networks for the support and control of military forces. 
Intelligence A product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, interpretation, and 
integration of all information concerning one or more aspects of foreign 
countries or areas, which is immediately or potentially significant to the 
development and execution of policies, plans, and operations.  
Interoperability The ability of armed forces of different nations to operate each other’s 
equipment and to interchange the components of such equipment. 
Irregular War Combat between the armed forces of states and other belligerent entities, both 
foreign and domestic, which may have no fixed abode, and employing the most 
suitable weapons. 
Lead Time The amount of time between the start of the development of a capability until 
its operational deployment.  
Manoeuvre Warfare A doctrine or approach to the conduct of war that emphasizes the specific, 
systemic disruption of the opponent, aimed at suddenly collapsing the 
adversary’s will to resist over time, through the application of superior 
stratagems.  
Military Doctrine The fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof 
guide their actions in support of military objectives.  It is authoritative but 
requires judgement in application. 
Military Strategy The art and science of employing military power under all circumstances to 
attain national security objectives by applying force or the threat of force. 
MK Umkhonto we Sizwe, or ‘Spear of the Nation’:  The armed wing of the ANC, and 
integrated into the SANDF since 1994.  
Mobilization The act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and 
organising national resources; the process by which the armed forces or part of 
them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.  
This includes assembling and organising personnel, supplies, and materiel for 
active military service.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ix 
 
Term Definition 
National Interest A highly generalised concept of elements that constitute a state’s compelling 
needs (including self-preservation, independence, national integrity, military 
security and economic well-being), the protection or expansion of which may 
result in the threat or employment of military force. 
National Objectives The fundamental aims, goals or purposes of a nation (as opposed to the methods 
of achieving those ends) toward which a policy is directed and the nation’s 
energies are applied.   
National Policy  A broad course of action or guiding statements adopted by a government to help 
meet national objectives. 
National Power The combined resources (political, economic, technological, social, military, and 
geographic) of a nation that comprise the totality of its capabilities or potential.   
National Strategy The art and science of developing and applying the political, economic, 
psychological, and military powers of a nation during peace and war to meet 
national objectives. 
People’s War  A strategy of protracted armed revolutionary struggle, based on the teachings of 
Mao Zedong, which recognizes the simultaneous political- and military conflict, 
but in which the focus is on organisation (drawing large numbers of people into 
the range of revolutionary structures) and communication (propaganda). 
Revolutionary War  Efforts to seize political power by illegitimate and/or coercive means, destroying 
existing systems of government and social structures in the process. 
SA Army South African Army 
SA Air Force South African Air Force 
SADF South African Defence Force (prior to 1994) 
SA Navy South African Navy 
SANDF South African National Defence Force (since 1994) 
Strategic Credibility The perception by a nation that an opponent has both adequate military forces 
and the national will to act in accordance with its declared strategy. 
Strategic Defence The strategy and forces designed primarily to protect a nation, its outposts, 
and/or its allies from the hazards of general war.   
Strategic Offence The strategy and forces designed primarily to destroy an enemy’s war-making 
capacity during a general war, or to so degrade it that the opposition collapses.   
Sufficiency A level of military strength that is adequate to achieve the objectives of a given 
country.  Depending on various factors, superiority, equality, or inferiority of 
military strength compared to a rival may be considered sufficient.   
Tactical; Tactics Referring to battlefield operations in general; the detailed methods used to 
execute strategic- and/or operational designs. 
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Introduction 
 
1. Background 
 
The domain of international relations have undergone profound changes since the last decade of the 
20th Century, giving rise to (among others) fresh thinking about the development, deployment and 
employment of armed forces.  It was during this time that South Africa, too, embarked upon a socio-
political transformation:  a venture that not only occurred within the country’s most severe 
economic recession since the 1930s,1 but also resulted in the country’s demilitarisation.  In the 
absence of a military threat to the state, the decision-makers of those early days should have had a 
relatively free hand to draft appropriate defence policy, from which the DOD would have been able 
to derive a ‘good’ military strategy conforming to the criteria of suitability, feasibility, and 
acceptability.2  Defence policy, in turn, was obliged to account for the higher imperatives of the new 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which stated the following regarding national defence:3  
 
“(1) The defence force must be structured and managed as a disciplined military force. 
(2) The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial 
integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international 
law regulating the use of force.” 
 
Within four years of democratisation, defence policy was therefore formalised by the publication of 
(among others) the White Paper on National Defence (1996)4 and the Defence Review (1998),5 in 
quick succession.  Three policy prescripts, in particular, were significant for the development of the 
armed forces’ capabilities that was to follow:  first, the injunction that the South African National 
Defence Force’s force levels, armaments and military expenditure shall be determined by defence 
                                               
1
  Batchelor, P., Dunne, P. and Saal, D. 1999.  Military Spending and Economic Growth in South 
Africa.  SADCI Defence Digest, Working Paper No 6, p 1 and 2.  While GDP growth averaged 
less than 1% per annum in real terms, the GNP per capita declined every year and inflation 
averaged 13.6% per annum. 
2
  Yarger, H.R. 2006.  Strategic Theory for the 21
st
 Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy.  
Carlisle:  US Army War College, p 16.   
3
  Republic of South Africa.  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (2011 edition), 
Chapter 11 Section 200. 
4
  Republic of South Africa.  White Paper on Defence, May 1996 (available at 
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/SouthAfrica1996.pdf). 
5
  Republic of South Africa.  South African Defence Review 1998 (available at 
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/SouthAfrica1998.pdf).  
1
2 
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policy as it is derived from (among others) an analysis of the external and internal security 
environment.  Second, it was envisaged that the “SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and 
technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently”6 
and, third, that the primary role of the SANDF “shall be to defend South Africa against external 
military aggression”7 (accent by the researcher).  To summarize:  in terms of policy, the development 
of the armed forces was ultimately to be driven by real security needs, premised upon their cost-
effectiveness in the execution of military tasks, and to be exclusively employed in a defensive, non-
coercive role.  Before getting there, however, the SANDF had the obligation — also in terms of the 
new defence policy — to integrate the various statutory- and non-statutory forces into a single 
entity.  
 
For the first decade after 1994, the SANDF as an organisation therefore had an internal, structural 
focus.  The services dedicated themselves to the organisation’s deliberate transformation,8 aimed 
primarily at legitimising the national defence function rather than ensuring the military’s capability to 
execute its constitutional mandate.9  This focus was especially true for the SA Army, since it was not 
only the largest and least technology-dependant service — and therefore destined to absorb the vast 
majority of integrating personnel from their former forces — but also because it has not benefited 
from any new equipment that the SANDF was to acquire through government’s Strategic Arms 
Package (SAP) deal.10  Accordingly, the Army was not obliged to implement changes to its doctrine or 
to absorb new technology in the short term; it was instead allowed to concentrate on transforming 
its structure and organisational culture, through a process of innovation in its broad sense:11  
introducing a new leadership, command and management paradigm; relinquishing the former staff 
compartment system in favour of a novel, joint support system; and surrendering its primary mission 
of the conduct of military operations to a Joint Operations division, while rating the force preparation 
responsibility. 
 
From a military-strategic point of view, there could have been additional reasons for the political 
focus on the SA Army.  The new government would have been aware of the fact that, historically, 
armies and states of the past have created each other; that only land armies can ensure sustained 
                                               
6
  White Paper on Defence, op cit p 7. 
7
  Ibid. 
8
  Transformation:  A marked change in nature, form, or appearance (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 
Tenth Edition, 1999); also, a change from one qualitative state to another (better) condition.  In 
South Africa, the word usually connotes the political transformation of a society or institution, 
having proportional racial representation — and not organisational effectiveness or efficiency — 
as a primary outcome.   
9
  Esterhuyse, A. 2010.  Getting the Job Done:  Transformation in the South African Military.  
Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXXII No 1, June 2010, pp 1 - 30. 
10
  Sylvester, J. and Seegers, A  2008.  South Africa’s Strategic Arms Package:  A Critical Analysis. 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 36, No 1, p. 53. 
11
  Innovate:  Make changes in something already existing, as by introducing new methods, ideas or 
products (Concise Oxford Dixtionary, op cit).   
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control over geographic borders and territory, which is an essential attribute of sovereign statehood; 
that only ground forces can hope to gain control of populations or effect regime change; finally, that 
an otherwise-capable army may prevail over a technologically advanced adversary, much more so 
than in the case of a poorly-equipped air force or navy.12  In any event, the SA Army’s initial, 
generalist strategic focus on the integration of the former forces, and its accompanying inculcation of 
a human rights culture, had officially petered out prior to the year 2006; consequently, the Army 
introduced the first iteration of what was to become its ‘Future Strategy’ at this time.13  While the 
strategy remained without any authority outside of the Army — and had, by the end of 2011, not 
passed muster at the Military Command Council (MCC)14 or Plenary Defence Staff Council (PDSC)15 — 
it was to serve as the Army’s guiding light towards organisational- and military capability 
development for a number of years thereafter, albeit not in isolation of other policy guidelines.16   
 
2. Motivation for the Study 
 
The thesis topic arose from a pragmatic interest in the measure of alignment between South African 
defence policy (at national level, but also including the SA Army’s ‘future strategy’ at service level), 
and the actual military capabilities that policy has consequently spawned.  The fact that approved 
defence policy is well-documented, and that a new consultative draft Defence Review was published 
on 12 April 2012, implied that sufficient and appropriate data was available for analysis.  It is 
therefore also possible to compare the Defence Review of 1998 and its latter iteration over time, 
making deductions and conclusions on the evolution of defence policy in general.  However, some 
reservations accompanied the choice of the research topic:  the capabilities of the SANDF represent 
the outcomes of its force development efforts, which is currently politically sensitive and on which 
open, unclassified literature for an academic study is in short supply.  While this challenge was bound 
to affect the validity of the research report, the researcher attempted to mitigate this particular risk 
by the application of standard methodological process, taking cognisance of other sources of bias as 
well; to whit, the researcher is a serving member of the SANDF, has first-hand experience of 
developments in the Army since 1975, and has a personal interest in the South African military’s 
evolution over the past two decades.  
 
                                               
12
  Baylis, J., Wirtz J.J. and Gray,C.S. 2010.  Strategy in the Contemporary World.  New York:  
Oxford University Press, 3
rd
 ed, p 126. 
13
  SA Army June 2006.  Strategic Profile of the SA Army 2020.  Pretoria:  SA Army Office, 1
st
 ed.  
14
  The Military Command Council, comprising of the service- and divisional chiefs, and chaired by 
the Chief SANDF.  
15
  The Plenary Defence Staff Council, dealing with policy matters and comprising of the MCC and 
the defence secretariat; jointly chaired by the Chief SANDF and the Secretary for Defence.  
16
  Colonel H.P. Grobler, Future SA Army Strategy Project Officer, noted on 25 July 2013.  The 
Future Strategy fully acknowledged the meta-policy injunctions of the Constitution, the White 
Paper, and the Defence Review. 
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At a higher level, the thesis may even be of practical benefit to South African policymakers.  More 
than a decade has elapsed since the first and only publications of democratic South Africa’s White 
Paper and the Defence Review, assuredly making its content dated, and possibly obsolete.  
Accusations of institutional dereliction in producing a new iteration of the defence review have 
accordingly received much coverage in the national media.  Since the defence policy had first been 
promulgated, government has, indeed, attempted to adjust South Africa’s defence policy on at least 
two previous occasions, with ‘Update 2005’ being the first17 and the department’s efforts since the 
ministerial announcement on 03 July 2009 the second.18  The most recent attempt at a definitive 
defence policy started in 2011, and has had some criticism levelled against the process that was 
being followed right from the start:  first, an apparent disregard for consultative and parliamentary 
processes, coupled with a vested interest in procurement decisions and a weakened oversight by civil 
society; second, the conduct of a defence review in the absence of an overarching national security 
policy framework.19  (Unbeknown to analysts at the time, the minister also instructed the 2012 
Defence Review Committee to adopt a ‘budget-independent approach’:  a method that has serious 
implications for the resultant policy’s feasibility, as the study will later allude to.)  
 
At a departmental level, the study concerns itself with the risk of the SANDF — and especially the SA 
Army — reneging on its policy mandate.  Following on the obligations of the Constitution, as well as 
the imperatives of the White Paper on Defence, the Defence Review and the demands of the SA 
Army’s Future Strategy, the SANDF is required to be militarily competent.  However, given the fact 
that the defence force is not currently engaged in combat, and that empirical evidence as to its 
actual performance on the battlefield is therefore absent, the armed forces’ effectiveness in their 
‘primary role’ is presently unproven and arguable.  Adding to the uncertainty is the fact that, in 
common with other defence forces worldwide, the South African Department of Defence will make 
neither the raw data nor the collated results of its own assessments on the SANDF’s preparedness 
available to the public.  Nevertheless, the capabilities of the SA Army, in particular, are of importance 
for at least three reasons:  it is by far the largest component of the SANDF, it is currently the most 
heavily committed in military operations (as it has been in the past, and will probably be in the 
future), and an invasion over South Africa’s landward border was deemed the most plausible without 
involvement of a superpower or coalition of major powers.20  The research may therefore also be of 
some value to the SA Army, since it has recently experienced a change of command and may 
                                               
17
  Briefing to Defence Portfolio Committee on 14 June 2005 (available at  www.pmg.org.za/minutes/ 
2005/0613-white-paper-defence-review-restructuring-briefing-special-defence-account-
amendment)   
18
  Appropriation Bill : Debate on Vote No 19 – Defence (available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/hansard/20090703-appropriation-bill-debate-vote-no-19-defence) 
19
  Mills, G. 2011.  An Option of Difficulties?  A 21
st
 Century South African Defence Review.  
Discussion Paper 2011/07, The Brenthurst Foundation, Johannesburg, p 5.   
20
  Defence Review 1998 op cit p 13. 
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appreciate new insights into its capability development paradigm.  Last, the Army is but part of a 
larger system, implying that other stakeholders may interpret, and selectively apply, the research 
results to the remaining services of the SANDF as well.  
 
3. The Research Problem 
 
After careful consideration of the discourse on the relationship between defence policy and military 
capability, the following research question is posed:  what is the current variance between South 
Africa’s declared defence policy and the actual military capability of the SANDF?  The thesis therefore 
aims at describing the delta21 between the intended objectives of defence policy and the actual 
outcomes of the SANDF’s capability development22 programmes, as the latter had evolved between 
the years 2000 and 2012.  The following framework illustrates the logic of the study’s progression 
towards the resolution of the research problem:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1:  Problem - Solving Sequence 
 
                                               
21
  Mathematicians describe a ‘delta’ as the symmetric difference between sets of elements that are 
in either of the sets and not at their intersection.  In the case of this study, it would mean a 
description of the conceptual union between defence policies and the actual strategic capabilities 
of the SANDF, excluding the commonality between them.   
22
  The RSA does not presently face an armed threat, either from within or from beyond its borders. 
Empirical evidence of its armed forces’ current effectiveness in combat operations is therefore 
inadequate.  However, one may derive sufficient substantiation for an assessment of the 
SANDF’s predicted military effectiveness from the outcomes of its force development activities.   
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The thesis is a product of applied research, which — given the surfeit of background knowledge on 
the research topic — fits best into the mould of a confirmatory- rather than an exploratory study.  
However, categorizing the study as either ‘descriptive’ or ‘explanatory’ is less obvious, since it is 
bound to employ both kinds of knowledge:  on the one hand, the data, facts, and empirical 
generalisations that affirm the actual state of affairs, and on the other those theories and 
interpretations that suggest causes — or plausible explanations — for why the objects of scrutiny 
appear the way they do.23  The study focuses on examining the prescripts of defence policy and the 
competency attributes of the South African military; ultimately, though it will conclude on the 
meaning of the relationship between the two data sets.  One can therefore typify the study as a 
qualitative, descriptive analysis, with risk accruing to its theoretical- and inferential validity in 
particular.  During the conceptualisation phase, the study had to overcome the first-mentioned 
hazard by conducting a thorough literature review, and by obtaining clarity on the definitions that it 
will use; as for the mitigation of the second threat, the study will address rival explanations as part of 
its analysis and data interpretation in each successive chapter hereafter.  First, though, the study has 
to establish a foundation for its arguments.   
 
As with strategy, one would not be able to draw valid conclusions from a particular example of 
defence policy without considering the context — the relevant set of circumstances surrounding a 
particular situation or event — in which the originators conceived it.  Colin Gray, for example, 
believes that the dimensions of military strategy may be generically eternal, but that the character 
and conduct (the tactics) of military activities is invariably adapted to the governing political, social, 
economic, and technological conditions.24  (To this set of considerations, Gray later added the 
military, geographical and historical factors.)25  The study therefore commences by providing the 
policy context after the Cold War, and initially employs an inductive process that changes focus from 
a generalised description towards specific theories that are relevant to the subject of the analysis.  
With an understanding of the policy paradigm thus established, the study turns towards a description 
of South African defence policy publications, followed by the perceived capabilities of the SANDF 
(with greater accent on the SA Army), and concluding with a description of the alignment between 
the two variables.  The framework above also provides the sequencing of objectives that the 
research report seek to achieve, as follows:  
 
                                               
23
  Mouton, J. 1996.  Understanding Social Research.  Pretoria:  J.L. van Schaik Publishers, pp 107 
– 118. 
24
  Gray, C.S. 1998.  RMAs and the Dimensions of Strategy.  In:  Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ), 
Autumn/Winter 1997 – 98, p 51. 
25
  Schnaubelt, C.N. 2011.  Strategy and the Comprehensive Approach.  In:  Neal, D.J. and Wells, L. 
(eds).  Capability Development in Support of Comprehensive Approaches:  Transforming 
International Civil-Military Interactions.  Washington DC:  NDU Press, for the Center for 
Technology and Security Policy, p 56. 
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1. First, to acquire a thorough understanding of the modern context within which a 
national state’s defence policy is compiled, and its military capabilities developed in 
accordance with policy directives.  The theory that is developed in this section would 
assist in the design of a broad framework for the analysis of the South African 
example;  
2. Second, to analyse the declared South African defence policy (as it stood between 
the years 2000 and 2012), in order to determine its implications for the theoretical 
competencies of the SANDF in general and the SA Army in particular;  
3. thereafter to describe the perceived capabilities of the SANDF, being the actual 
outcomes of defence policy; and 
4. in the last instance, to interpret the data and to arrive at valid conclusions that would 
answer the research question.   
 
4. Operational Definitions 
 
This study is concerned with the military, as an element of national security.  Barry Buzan (2009) 
describes the security domain as comprising of five principal areas: the environmental (biospheric); 
the social (cultural); the political; the economic; last, the military.26  Referring to the concept of 
security within the context of the international system, Buzan maintains that it connotes primarily 
with the freedom from threat:  “…security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their 
independent identity and their functional integrity. … Its bottom line is about survival, but it also 
includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence.”27  When this study 
therefore talks about a revolution in security affairs, it does so under the premise that defence and 
security are not synonymous, and that a revolution of this kind points to a notable discontinuity in 
the relevance of military power overall.28  In further expansion of the relationship between defence 
and security, David Chuter (2011) provides a description of national security strategy that is of value 
to the study:  “National security strategy is the process of maintaining, coordinating and employing 
the assets of the security sector so that they contribute optimally to the nation’s strategic goals.”  29  
The armed forces are a major component of the security sector; therefore national security 
imperatives, whether explicated in a security strategy or not, should be primary drivers for defence 
policy.  However, the study is also interested in the utility of military force per se, and in the utility of 
military forces in other security applications. 
                                               
26
  Buzan, B. 2009.  People, States and Fear:  An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era.  Colchester:  ECPR Press, 2
nd
 edition, p 38. 
27
  Ibid, p 37. 
28
  Gray, C.S. 2005.  Another Bloody Century:  Future Warfare.  London:  Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p 
117. 
29
  Chuter, D. 2011.  Governing and Managing the Defence Sector.  Brooklyn Square, Pretoria:  
Institute for Security Studies, p 13. 
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When it therefore speaks of a revolution in strategic affairs, the study is concerned with those broad 
and profound changes that affect the usefulness of threatening, or employing, military force in 
operations.30  As with the employment of military force, the development and deployment of military 
forces, too, are subject to the prescripts of defence policy — a term that the study uses in its narrow 
sense, as it pertains primarily to the military-political concerns of the state.31  A dictionary describes 
policy either as a course or principle of action, adopted or proposed by an organisation or individual, 
or — in its archaic connotation — as prudent or expedient conduct or action.32  In turn, the South 
African Department of Defence describes policy as “…a specific course of action that provides 
guidelines, prescripts, rules and regulations, which are obligatory in nature, for certain defined 
circumstances.  Policy is usually selected from various options, based on fixed principles, is 
authoritative and obligatory in nature and normally a determinant of current and future decisions.”33  
Consequently, a policy without implementation or action will have no authority in the society that it 
is supposed to manipulate — a point that Baylis et al (1987) reinforces by asserting that policy 
connotes not only with what it intends to achieve, but also with what occurs during its actual 
implementation.  In practice, then, one can think of government policy as a stream of purposeful 
action over time, incorporating not only what government is known to have done, but also what it 
intends doing, and what it is currently trying to do.34   
 
Policy therefore gives rise to activities, purposed at achieving the particular policy’s intent, and these 
activities render outcomes.  Furthermore, if the actions arising from the policy are of a design- and 
developmental nature, a policy analyst may very well — depending on the aims of the particular 
policy — describe these outcomes as capabilities, which is how the study employs the term.  The 
Oxford Dictionary (1999) describes a capability, in its core sense, as the power or ability to do 
something.35  (When used in its subsense, it may also mean “an undeveloped or unused faculty.”)36  
Two additional (and related) concepts are worthy of elucidation at this stage.  The first is that of 
                                               
30
  Gray, C.S. 2005 op cit p 117. 
31
  Murray, D.J. and Viotti, P.R. (eds) 1982.  The Defense Policies of Nations:  A Comparative Study. 
Baltimore:  John Hopkins University Press, p 7.  
32
  Pearsall, J. (ed) 1999.  The Concise Oxford Dictionary:  Tenth Edition.  New York:  Oxford 
University Press, p 1106.  
33
  Department of Defence 2012.  Department of Defence Instruction Pol&Plan/00008/1999 (Edition 
4):  Policy on the Development, Promulgation and Maintenance of Defence (Level 1) Instructions.  
Defence Policy, Strategy and Planning Division, p A-3. 
34
  Baylis, J., Booth, K., Garnett, J. and Williams, P. 1987.  Contemporary Strategy II:  The Nuclear 
Powers.  London:  Croom Helm Ltd, 2
nd
 edition, p 2. 
35
  Pearsal, J. (ed), op cit p 206. 
36
  Note that the dictionary does not qualify the ‘power or ability’ with adjectives such as declared, 
perceived, predicted, proven, practiced, or actual.  The arguments of the thesis, however, could 
not avoid such qualifying statements; in fact, moderating judgements in this vein were essential to 
arrive at a valid description of the delta between policy and capability. 
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being efficient, which means working productively with minimum wasted effort or expense.37  In this 
case, the focus is on the economical utilisation of resources.  While this attribute is certainly 
important in both the process and the outcomes of the SA Army’s force development activities (and 
also receives more than a passing mention in defence policy), it is the concept of effectiveness that is 
usually associated with capable militaries.  Being effective means producing a desired or intended 
result,38 which description — for the military — connotes with the successful execution of the 
organisation’s mission, in reasonable disregard of absolute resource cost.  In spite of its potential 
importance for state security, the literature on military effectiveness does not provide a generally 
acceptable definition for the concept.39  Brooks and Stanley describe it as “…the capacity to create 
military power from a state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human 
capital.”40  This definition accentuates military power in its totality, and therefore joins military 
potential and military employment in one concept.  On the other hand, Millett, Murray and Watman 
(1990) define military effectiveness as “…the process by which armed forces convert resources into 
fighting power”,41 thereby confining military effectiveness to its expression in armed combat only.  In 
their focus on military effectiveness as a resource conversion process, both definitions introduce the 
element of efficiency (as opposed to the related concept of effectiveness) in the management of 
human resources, morale, the intellectual qualities of military leaders, financial budgets, technology 
and equipment, policy and doctrine, and others.  This approach to military effectiveness seems to be 
more concerned with executing activities correctly (as opposed to effecting the correct activities). 
 
Other authors therefore argue that Millett, Murray, and Watman’s definition is inadequate, because 
it neglects to account for the particular military force’s purpose:  its object or ‘ends’, in the parlance 
of military strategy.42  On the same topic, Bernasconi (2007) appears to be correct when he indicates 
that military effectiveness is dynamic and changes with time; consequently, that one should always 
consider a military’s competence within its historical context — which is what Chapter 2 of this study 
is all about.43  In addition, the study is concerned with the implementation of defence policy and the 
employment of military capabilities in the mitigation and/or elimination of security threats and risks.  
The researcher applies these two concepts in the sense that Chuter uses it, with a threat denoting “a 
person or thing causing a risk or regarded in relation to risk”, while a risk is “a situation involving 
                                               
37
  Pearsal J. (ed) op cit p 456.   
38
  Ibid.   
39
  Millett, A.R. and Murray, W. (eds) 1990.  Military Effectiveness.  Vol 1:  The First World War. 
London:  Unwin Hyman Ltd, p 1.   
40
  Brooks, R.A. and Stanley, E.A. (eds) 2007.  Creating Military Power:  The Sources of Military 
Effectiveness.  Stanford, California:  Stanford University Press, p 9. 
41
  Millett, A.R. and Murray, W. (eds) op cit p 2. 
42
  Bernasconi, J. 2007.  Military Effectiveness:  A Reappraisal.  School of Advanced Military 
Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, p 
1. 
43
  Ibid, pp 2 – 7. 
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exposure to danger”.44  Institutions such as governments and armed forces usually address risks in 
order of priority, which they calculate as a combination of two primary factors:  the probability of the 
risk being realised, and the impact on the organisation’s purpose if it does. 
 
Last, the study also bases its conclusions on the ubiquitous influence of culture on all things social, 
whether it is the making of institutional policy or its style of policy implementation.  To this end, the 
study utilises Schein’s enduring definition of organisational culture:  “Culture can now be defined as 
(a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it 
learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked 
well enough to be considered valid, and therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct 
way to perceive, think, or feel in relation to these problems.”45  From this point of view, a defence 
policy — comprising of its policy publications, the actions that it generated, and the outcomes that it 
subsequently achieved — may be no more, and no less, than a cultural artefact.  
 
5. Overview of Chapters 
 
The forthcoming chapter therefore details the theoretical foundation of the study, focussing on the 
modern (post-1990) conceptualisation of military power.  It covers theories of international politics, 
state security and military force; further, it delves into the relationship between defence policy and 
military capability, and concludes by developing a framework for analysis in the South African 
context.  The following chapter then continues with an analysis of salient South African defence 
policy publications, which includes the SA Army’s future strategy, and closes with a description of the 
observed defence policy paradigm.  In further pursuit of a solution to the research problem, the 
subsequent chapter then provides a broad description of the SA Army’s perceived military 
capabilities — the actual policy outcomes, which the thesis also discusses under the headings of the 
framework previously developed.  Finally, the thesis presents a summary of the main conclusions, 
being its synthesis from the preceding evidence and the analysis thereof.   
 
                                               
44
  Pearsall, J. (ed) 1999.  The Concise Oxford Dictionary:  Tenth Edition.  New York:  Oxford 
University Press, p 1 235.   
45
  Schein, E. 1990.  Organizational Culture.  In:  American Psychologist, Vol 45(2), February 1990, 
p 110 (available at http:/psycnet.apa.org/journals/amp/45/2/109/) 
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A Modern Conceptualisation of Military Power 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When a theory fails to explain an observed phenomenon, the world of science replaces it by another 
that does.  Such a paradigm shift occurred within the fields of (among others) the political- and 
military sciences after the end of the Cold War, in a period when South Africa migrated towards a 
constitutional democracy and compiled its current defence policy.  Regarding the management of 
defence in particular, some analysts even thought that two concurrent reforms were underway:  
first, rapid changes in the means and methods of warfare, and second a transformation of the socio-
cultural context of war itself.46  However, there was much less agreement on the characteristics of a 
viable replacement theory for the conduct of war:  to all, it appeared that inter-state war had 
become obsolescent as an instrument of state policy, but only some took this to be the result of 
conscious policy decisions.  Others considered it a temporary consequence of policymakers failing to 
adapt to new realities, and adhering to an inappropriate theory of interstate industrial war when a 
new-style employment of military force was workable.47  Nevertheless, it was highly unlikely that any 
state’s defence policy would have been able to account completely for the changing international 
security paradigm within a short space of time.48  The archetype of the Cold War had served many 
purposes and interests, which national states could not simply abandon without realising the risk of 
structural instabilities in both their domestic- and international relations environments.  With its two 
armed conflicts concluded – the war on the Namibia/Angola border and the internal ‘people’s war’ - 
South Africa, too, had to deal with the legacy of a defence policy, a military doctrine, organisational 
structures, and military equipment from an era that has ended, and that the state now had to 
reinvent.  
 
Given the history of the ruling party’s liberation struggle from 1961 onwards, South African 
policymakers should have been more aware than most that modern armed conflicts contain 
                                               
46
  Gray, C.S. 2006.  Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare: The 
Sovereignty of Context.  In:  Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Monograph, US Army War College, 
Carlisle, pp 19 – 20 (available at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=640). 
47
  Smith, R. 2006.  The Utility of Force:  The Art of War in the Modern World.  London:  Penguin 
Books, p 26. 
48
  The Human Development Report of 1994 provides a good indication of the changed scope of 
security studies theory (available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/).  
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contradictions to industrial-age conventional war, such as the fact that the actors are mostly non-
state, often with a multi-national alliance on one side and sub-state groupings on the other.  With 
the political victory of the pre-eminent liberation movement – the African National Congress (ANC) - 
on 27 April 1994, defence policymakers should have been cognizant of the fact that military forces no 
longer fight to obtain decisive victories on the battlefield:  rather, to preserve their forces, and to 
create security conditions in which the political outcome may be decided.49  It is from this point of 
view that conventional military force (previously the primary way in which states exercised military 
power) and its associated military structures (the means employed in armed conflict) no longer 
appeared suitable to support the achievement of political objectives.  
 
The argumentation in this chapter is the first step in arriving at the study’s synthesis.  It seeks to 
provide a universal, validated setting, within which context the thesis can situate the relationship 
between South Africa’s defence policy and the outcomes of the SANDF’s force development 
activities, with the SA Army singled out for special attention.  The remainder of the chapter will 
therefore set the scene for the eventual discussion of the causal variable (defence policy) and its 
dependent variable (military capabilities), by addressing a number of related and convergent 
concerns in a particular order:  from the esoteric, philosophical, and general to the concrete, 
practical and specific.  The discussion intends to provide an adequate understanding of the changes 
that the paradigms of international politics and military power have undergone since the end of the 
Cold War, as well as an appreciation for the traditional aim of defence policies:  effectiveness in the 
execution of the military mission.   
 
2. Archetypical Philosophies of War 
 
This chapter argues that humans are inclined to hold deep and pervasive beliefs regarding the 
phenomena such as war, armed conflict, and relations among societies.  However, since it is not even 
remotely possible to capture the full scope of such abstract notions, even knowledgeable individuals 
reduce and simplify their perceptions of reality into conceptual maps or frameworks:  archetypes 
that are invariably distorted and only partial reflections of reality.50  In time, the mental frameworks 
become convictions that influence the way human actors acquire, process, and interpret information 
from the material world.  Preconceived perceptions of reality, rather than objective facts and pure 
reason, tend to guide our response to situations in our physical environment.  Policymakers, for 
example, will invariably use information shortcuts “…to make political judgements and to relate their 
                                               
49
  Smith, R. op cit p 269.  Smith also emphasizes that armed conflicts are interminable, and are 
fought among the people, not on a battlefield – all of which would be familiar to a student of 
revolutionary- and guerrilla warfare.  
50
  Kegley, C.W. (Jr) and Wittkopf, E.R. 1995.  World Politics:  Trend and Transformation (Fifth 
Edition).  New York, St. Martin’s Press, p 11. 
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preferences toward specific policy issues to their general beliefs.”51  The mental framework of 
policymakers, along with the particular paradigm’s implicit values and norms, collectively define the 
essence of the ‘truth’ from which governments derive their international relations- and defence 
policies.  These convictions become more visible, among scholars and policymakers alike, when 
sudden changes in socio-political circumstances force them to re-examine their foreign policy 
priorities and national security objectives.52  Kegley and Wittkopf (1995) are of the opinion that 
World War I, World War II, and the Cold War “…(e)ach stimulated a search for the causes of war and 
the foundations of peace; each reshaped policymakers’ images about the principles that organize 
world politics and the policy programs that could best preserve world order; each caused the 
dominant world order view to be jettisoned and encouraged the search for new theoretical 
orientations.”53  Identifying policymakers’ beliefs regarding international relations and war would 
therefore be akin to recognising the motive for the country’s defence policy.  
 
Since the beginning of the 20th Century, the role of armed forces has changed:  from the conduct of 
war, to the management of defence following the Second World War, and subsequently to the 
management of peace after the Cold War.54  Regardless of the expansion of defence objectives into 
other territories, though,55 the ultimate raison d’ etre of armed forces remained in their capacity to 
manage violent conflict and war.  What a society believes about war — its nature, causes, purposes, 
consequences, and so on — will consequently have a bearing on how it prepares for armed conflict, 
wages war or otherwise employs its armed forces.56  A state’s defence policy will therefore reflect its 
dominant philosophy of war as well, albeit to a variable extent.  One often–mentioned teleological 
categorization of the philosophies of war is that of Anatol Rapoport, which appeared in his 
introduction to the otherwise eschewed J.J. Graham translation of Clausewitz’s On War.  Williams 
(2008) provides a summary of these three philosophies that is concise enough for the purposes of 
the current study.  The primary difference between the various philosophies hinges on the analyst’s 
views of determinism or free will.57  If war is inevitable and beyond human control, then society 
becomes a victim of circumstance and man is absolved from responsibility for waging it; on the other 
hand, if war is a product of free will, then humanity has choices in preparing for conflict and 
employing armed force in pursuit of its collective objectives.  An analyst can therefore place each of 
                                               
51
  Ibid, p 15. 
52
  Ibid, p 17. 
53
  Ibid, p 18. 
54
  Burk, J.  Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession.  In: Snider, DM & 
Watkins, G (eds) 2002.  The Future of the Army Profession.  New York:  McGraw-Hill, p 29. 
55
  For example:  “to contribute to freedom from fear and want, including the promotion of human 
security, both nationally and internationally.”  (Department of Defence, Strategic Plan (MTEF FY 
2010/11 to FY 2012/13), p 10 (available at http://www.mil.za) 
56
  Williams, P.D.  War.  In: Williams, P.D. (ed) 2008.  Security Studies:  An Introduction.  New York:  
Routledge, p 152. 
57
  Moseley, A.  The Philosophy of War, p 2 (available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/war/). 
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the philosophies at some point between the theoretical absolutes of unlimited choice and 
unavoidable fate.  First, the political philosophy of war considers armed conflict to be a rational 
activity, undertaken by political authority in pursuance of legitimate national objectives.58  Societies 
in this orientation view the armed forces as an element of national power, wielded as an instrument 
of foreign policy; rational actors cause war, professionals manage it, and perpetrators – sovereign 
states - seek a military victory is as a precondition for a political settlement.  Making war (and writing 
policy and preparing armed forces to wage it) would therefore be an act of free will entirely.  This 
Clausewitzian approach is also in alignment with the political-rationalist school of thought,59 
according to which one could expect defence policies biased towards effectiveness and efficiency, 
with states developing armed forces tailor-made to execute their selected mandates. 
 
In contrast, the eschatological philosophy takes the view that all major wars are steps in a process 
that will ultimately result in a final conflict, from which a new society will arise, for better or worse.  
In the messianic version of the philosophy, the underlying cause of war is the unfolding of an 
underlying, metaphysical master plan of divine- or natural origin.60  The global version of this 
particular philosophy, on the other hand, emphasises a struggle between political ideologies, in 
which one side will be victorious and establish its own version of the truth among humankind, thus 
ending conflict and war forever.  The driving forces of the Cold War contained strong eschatological 
overtones, as do the ‘holy wars’ and ‘jihads’ of the modern age.61  Policy choices arising from this 
philosophy would possibly attach less importance to, among others, the economics of military 
power, the morality of war, and the negative consequences of force employment.  Last, the 
cataclysmic philosophy perceives war, whether sensed as a bane of God or as an indifferent 
consequence of an anarchic global system, to be an event without purpose besides causing loss, 
destruction, and suffering.62  As with the previous philosophy, this one also comes in two varieties.  
In its limited form, the ethnocentric class of cataclysm allegedly befalls specific ethnic groups, races 
or nations only.  War is defined as an ineluctable act of another (group, race, nation), often under 
divine influence, that brings about disaster among ‘us’; ‘we’ have neither control over it, nor can it be 
averted.  We can only defend ourselves as best we can, and try to alleviate the worst consequences 
once war has happened.  The global variety, on the other hand, ascribes war to irresistible 
international forces that, in an anarchic and nihilistic manner, visits indiscriminate disaster upon the 
whole of humanity.  Societies within this paradigm (the United States during the Cold War, for 
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example)63 live in constant fear of full-scale war, developing militaries that may be required to deal 
with risks that would have the worst impact , rather than with contingencies that have the highest 
probability of occurrence.   
 
3. Converging Values amidst International Anarchy 
 
While one could not judge any of the philosophies to be either constructive or debilitating in 
principle, scholars may attach such value judgements to the actions that that these philosophies 
inspire.  This is because a society will capture elements of its governing philosophy of war in its 
political- and moral theories,64 which will consequently guide that state’s approach to international 
relations and international law.  For example:  those societies and states steeped in the international 
political lore of realism, which was dominant in the Cold War era and is possibly still so today, believe 
that there is little scope for the effective international regulation of inter-state politics and armed 
conflict.65  Such thinking would indicate strong leanings towards the political- and global cataclysmic 
philosophies of war.  Other polities may differ with this attitude, since empirical evidence indicates 
that coercion by means of military conflict is lately the exception rather than the norm, and that 
international law has now come to regulate most aspects of the relations among states.66  This 
perception of the conscious, common management of armed conflict has therefore been reducing 
the credibility of both the eschatological- and cataclysmic philosophies of war, with modern 
normative concepts seemingly encroaching on the traditional military stomping ground of 
international relations.  However, this does not imply that stakeholders are deliberately transforming 
the structure of the anarchic international system.   
 
One does not have to look very far to find evidence of international anarchy, in the sense that the 
system is comprised primarily of sovereign national states that have relations with each other, but 
are essentially without a central political authority.  Barry Buzan (2009) affirms:  ”(s)ince the claim of 
sovereignty automatically denies recognition of any higher political authority, a system of sovereign 
states is by definition politically structured as an anarchy.”67  Buzan also considers the international 
anarchy as a decentralized form of order, implying that the system of national states had evolved to 
higher levels of coherence and responsibility than had hereto been attainable within societies 
comprised of individual human beings.  While anarchy within states could easily result in the 
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Hobbesian vision of disorder and mayhem (and therefore be an indication of a failed- or 
dysfunctional state), the condition of anarchy among strong national states seems to produce the 
opposite effect.  “Indeed, no greater indication of the difference between anarchy at the individual 
and international levels is possible than the fact that the former requires the abolition of the state, 
whereas the latter finds its most perfect expression the state.”68  States, in fact, perpetuate and 
reinforce the anarchic international system by their individual actions to maintain their 
independence and sovereignty.  While this contributes to the persistence and durability of the 
anarchic condition, it also ensures that states remain self-sufficient and competitive in their relations 
towards each other.  Nevertheless, empirical evidence indicates that the growing pressure of global 
interdependence is mitigating the risks of violent conflict between national states, and therefore 
changing the way that both realists and idealists view the world.69  Why, then, do states — 
supposedly unconstrained by supra-national governance — increasingly appear to act in 
conformance with international law?  
 
The first explanation is that sovereign states – still the dominant political units of the world – now 
generally consider the consequences of military employment on their international reputations and 
legitimacy, before engaging in armed conflict of any kind.  Having the need to appear trustworthy 
and reliable, they base their judgements on enlightened self-interest and prudential calculation, 
anticipating that other states will reciprocate in future joint ventures.  In the second instance, it 
seems that the notion has developed since the end of the Cold War that policymakers consider 
adherence to the tenets of international law as a value in itself.70  Behavioural styles that conform to 
international rules, having acquired a substantive value, are now apparently deserving of universal 
respect and support.  The third reason for states’ observance of international law seems to be the 
recognition that, while adherence to some of the regulations may be irksome, the community of 
states should not condone the selective application of rules that suit partisan interests best.  Legal 
regulation as a whole has obtained a functional value, in that it ensures the maintenance of order 
and restricts maverick behaviour within the anarchic international system.71  The last reason for 
compliance with the international regimen may be simple conditioning, whereby states fall into the 
habit of adopting policies that are in accordance with international law.  Some states go even further 
and incorporate international obligations into domestic law, thus making their governments liable for 
prosecution in domestic courts if their policies violate international agreements.72 
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In the absence of military threats to national survival, the purpose of states now seems to be the 
creation of conditions for socioeconomic development and welfare, allied with individual rights, 
equality and justice.73  States focus inward, becoming servants of their peoples in ways that align 
with universal models for democratic involvement, socioeconomic development and human rights.  
Systems of universal mass education enhance the process at the individual level, by constantly 
reinforcing concepts of individuality and humanity of citizens within larger collectives.  Some also 
believe that all societies are attempting to transform themselves into archetypical, autonomous 
nation-states, which are mobilised within and among themselves by the common principles of 
human rights and individual liberties.  These states not only employ mutual definitions of their goals, 
but also consistently survey their environment in an effort to standardise the ways in which they 
mobilise resources, apply the tools of national sovereignty – including military force - and exercise 
control over their destinies.74 
 
However, the hypothesised interdependence and universal sharing of values would not have come 
about without modern information technology, which “…has the pernicious potential of altering, in a 
matter of years, basic values and cultural beliefs that take generations to create.”75  States have lost 
control over the flow of information, which gradually diminishes their sovereignty; consequently, 
jurisdiction over geographic territory – and the military power that was previously required to 
maintain it - is becoming much less significant as a driver of international competition than it used to 
be.76  Since the end of the Cold War, the rapid generation and dissemination of information also 
continued to mould mental models in a variety of domains, and at a global scale.  Analysts first saw 
increasing political- and military interdependence among groups of sovereign states, continuing to 
expand and grow in power.  Second, the world experienced the rising economic interdependence of 
a suite of national or subnational economies, associated with public- and private organizations that 
function internationally; and third, ample evidence is available of an inflated flow of instrumental 
culture around the world, whereby societies are validating shared models of social order.77  These 
three dimensions, in combination with each other and with the arguments already discussed, seem 
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to provide a coherent theory for changing attitudes towards the utility of war and military power, not 
only among states in particular, but also within world society in general.78 
 
Most of the advocates of socio-political regulation in the international arena are not intent upon the 
establishment of a world state bureaucracy, though; instead, they are predisposed towards 
developing a global system of shared norms and models.79  The trend is therefore towards the 
construction of common sets of principles and values – virtual universal cultures, in fact – that guide 
the actions of actors on the world stage.  The aggregating effects of globalisation may be most 
apparent horizontally, across the world’s spectrum of individuals, organisations and national states, 
but should also be visible by the direction that each country’s defence policy took.  One should 
therefore be witnessing standardised behavioural patterns in the domains of (among others) 
economics, politics, psychology and the employment of military force, which would all be indications 
of the increasing convergence of cultures and their associated values.  This is a consequence of 
isomorphism, by which institutions emulate those that are the most successful and bear the highest 
order of legitimacy.80  Hence, a brief investigation of the changing paradigms of international politics 
provides more evidence of the reasons why major powers with comparatively powerful militaries 
(and economies) constrain their defence policies in the ways described above.81   
 
4. Changing Paradigms of International Politics  
 
During the whole of the Cold War, realist thinking dominated both the academic theory of 
international relations and the actual policymaking associated with it.82  Indeed, the period from the 
1950s until about 1990 was mainly shaped by the realist conviction that the anarchic system of 
national states, driven by man’s lust for power (a central construct in the realist world-view), formed 
the foundation of societies’ behaviour.  Competition among states defined the global reality, while 
the risks arising from foreign threats took precedence over domestic problems and policies.  For 
realists, conflict among national states - and therefore military preparation for it – is inevitable.  The 
purpose of statecraft, and the ends of national strategy, is the survival of the national state in a 
hostile environment, while the principal means to achieve the goal is power.83  The development of 
military capabilities, sufficient to deter attack from potential adversaries, is essential to ensure the 
security of the state in this paradigm.  While allies may enhance the state’s ability to protect itself, 
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their commitment and loyalty should not be regarded as a given.  A capable state strives for self-
sufficiency first, and does not entrust its security to international organizations or to protection 
under international law;84 therefore, only the achievement of a balance of power can sustain a viable 
international system that is relatively free from inter-state war, albeit not from armed violence in 
general.   
 
However, the construct of realism was not, in spite of its evident utility and universal application 
during the Cold War, without its influential critics.  Under pressure from scholars and practitioners 
alike, realists were obliged to reform the image of realist theory since the 1990s into that which 
political scientists know as ‘neorealism’ or ‘structural realism’.85  While neorealism continues to 
embrace the dominance of the national state and the anarchic nature of the international system, 
the more recent approach no longer considers the irrepressible human need for power to be 
dictating the behaviour of states in international politics.  Instead, neorealists are of the opinion that 
the structure of the international system (whether bipolar, unipolar, or multipolar) affects the 
foreign policy choices of national leaders the most.86  States no longer necessarily seek power for its 
own sake (as a strategic end), but could merely be optimising its capabilities for its utility as an 
instrument (means) of national survival.87  Furthermore, Kegley and Wittkopf are in agreement with 
Waltz, a pioneer of neorealism, that states’ means to attain their foreign policy objectives fall in two 
categories:  those internal means that governments are in control of –military strength, economic 
capability, and domestic intellectual capital – and the means that states develop beyond the 
country’s borders – regional alliances, foreign relations, and international institutions.  In this view, 
the competencies of states (military, economic, diplomatic, and so forth) define their position within 
the global political system.  The concept of a state’s capability is therefore of special importance in 
the neorealist view, since changes in the distribution of capabilities among states automatically result 
in an adjustment to the higher-order structure of international political system as well.88 
 
Then again, realism is not the only mental model from which policy decisions on the development of 
capabilities may arise - other international political paradigms, which may be equally valid, have 
attached considerably less importance to military security from the start, and may accordingly 
generate policy that is much less demanding of its armed forces.  Since its formulation after World 
War I, the theory of idealism, originating from an archaic philosophical tradition of liberalism, has 
always been a divergent in its views on international politics.  Liberalism has always accentuated the 
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importance of liberty, equality, and common destiny among individuals (not states), and considered 
the pursuit of principle dominant over the need for power.89  Idealists therefore do not think of war 
as an inevitability, or even as a national problem; rather, as an international risk that demands 
collective or multilateral intervention to mitigate its effects or to prevent it from occurring at all.  For 
idealists, the solution to the problem of war lies in the mobilization of international society to 
eliminate those institutions that make war possible.  They therefore sought to advance the concept 
of collective security (as opposed to realism’s ideal of a balance of power), whereby the community 
of states would view an attack on one as aggression against all.90  Furthermore, idealists attempted 
to control the risk of going to war by legal process, such as mediation and arbitration between 
belligerents; also, by literally reducing the means of nations to go to war through disarmament- and 
arms control agreements.   
 
One problem for adherents of idealism was that, while their paradigm of choice flourished during the 
years between the two World Wars, only a modicum of their designs were tried, and even less 
succeeded in making an impact.  The international political theory of realism gained credence with 
the advent of World War II and, with idealism pushed into the background, reigned supreme until the 
last decade of the 20th Century.  Serious questions regarding the continued viability of realism then 
arose, since the theory failed to predict the end of the Cold War and the changes that began 
sweeping the globe in the 1990s.  Subsequent to a critical interrogation of both the realist and 
idealist paradigms, the liberal agenda morphed into a more sophisticated and pragmatic ‘neoliberal’ 
approach towards international politics.91  Seeking to operationalize its particular focus on peace, 
prosperity, and progress, the neoliberals developed an agenda that emphasized (among others) 
democratic governance, consideration of public opinion, mass education, free trade, liberal 
capitalism, international law, arms control, disarmament, collective security, and multilateral 
diplomacy.  One of the effects of the growing interdependence among the world’s countries was the 
linkage between the foreign- and domestic policies of states, which in turn resulted in a re-definition 
of national security.  With perspectives on aspects such as food security, economic security, physical 
security, global climate change, and other non-military issues gaining ascendancy in the debates 
among polities, the perceived utility of military power began to diminish.92   
 
During the literature study for this thesis, two theoretical perspectives of neorealism appeared to be 
particularly relevant to the compilation of defence policy.  First, the world-view of complex 
interdependence postulates that national states no longer seemed to be the only important actors 
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determining the ebb and flow of relations within the anarchic international discourse, and that 
national security issues — specifically the military balance of power — no longer would dominate 
foreign policy agendas.93  This approach presupposes that government policy would become far 
more sensitive to a range of economic, environmental, and societal issues than was the case during 
the Cold War, which considerations could also result in the acceptance of interdependence and 
multilateralism as the new norm for the conduct of state business.  Second, the liberal feminist 
theory offered a possible explanation for some of the observed changes in defence policies, in that it 
proposes an expanded role for women in policymaking, the management of security, and the 
conduct of international relations.94  Scholars and politicians embarked on this agenda for a number 
of reasons, but for the purposes of the current study, its relevance lies in the fact that disregard of 
females seemed to have caused bias, injustice and inequity in the conduct of international affairs.  
The attitude therefore accentuates justice, fairness, cooperation, and tolerance as philosophical 
foundation for the interaction among states, while it focusses on (for example) the performance of 
women as combatants in armed conflict:  “In this sense, feminist theory, like neoliberalism generally, 
is motivated by the quest for discovering the paths to greater international cooperation.”95 
 
5. Shifting the Focus from Military Power to National Security  
 
After the Cold War, the unease with both the realist- and idealist paradigms gave rise to a revision of 
national security concepts in general, and to the idea of military power in particular.  Advocates of a 
new conceptualisation either incorporated an extended range of social sciences (economics, 
psychology, sociology and anthropology), or additional international problems (intra—national 
threats, population growth, environmental degradation, poverty) in their models of national 
security.96  The paradigm shift has been a long time in the making; Barry Buzan (2009), for instance, is 
of the opinion that John Hertz’s idea of the ‘security dilemma’ in the early 1950s might have been the 
first major revelation in this regard.97  .  He further postulates that a theory of national security, 
confined to one level – that of individual states – and which focussed on military threats by default, 
was inherently insufficient to serve the needs of individuals, states and the universal good of 
humankind.98  By the 1990s the focus was therefore shifting away from strategic studies, which is 
about how the instruments of force influence relations among states, towards security studies.99  The 
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latter construct of international politics takes a much wider view of security, to include an increasing 
interdependence of ideas (theories of governance, economics, human rights) and the practical needs 
arising from the physical requirements for co-existence on the surface of the planet (for example the 
natural environment, resources, human demography).  Within this firming paradigm of 
interdependency, analysts saw military considerations playing second fiddle in the security debate.100  
In addition, the field of strategic studies (occupied primarily with concepts of military power) also 
suffered a loss of credibility, because its central doctrine of deterrence had failed to provide either 
intellectual or physical security to individual citizens, or to national states.  On the other hand, the 
challenge to idealists arose from the fact that neither the concepts of suppliant, isolationist policies, 
nor the collectivist policies towards global governance appeared to provide viable models for the 
attainment of national security in a universe of growing interdependence among states  
 
As a result, the idea of common security, which highlighted the interdependence of holistic security 
relations as opposed to national (military) strategic priorities, gained increasing support among the 
lesser-endowed countries of the world.101  Common security first came to the fore in the 
recommendations of the Palme Commission in 1982, after the inquiry proposed the interdependence 
of security relations as an alternative to the traditional national strategic priorities of states.  National 
defence policies henceforth had to reconcile the absence of authoritative governance over states 
with the deepening interdependence among them.102  Policymakers also had to contend with the fact 
that security - like freedom, justice, equality, and power - is an essentially contested concept:  it has 
ideological and moral content; is associated with deep convictions; and the views of individuals are 
impervious to change on the grounds of empirical evidence.103  Buzan is therefore convinced that the 
concept of ‘security’ provides a more flexible, perceptive, and functional vehicle for the analysis of 
international relations than either ‘power’ (the classic realists) or ‘peace’ (the idealists) does.104  The 
flexibility of the concept creates challenges for analysts, though.  It is a contested idea, and straddles 
both the worlds of philosophy and of application simultaneously.  While the theory answers some 
questions, it generates others that remain unresolved.  Some of the latter are related to the 
dichotomy between defence and security (referred to previously as the ‘security dilemma’); the 
opposing imperatives of individual security and national security; the tension between national 
security and international security; and last, but not least, the dilemma between the use of violent 
means to achieve benevolent ends.105  It is within this context that theories like non-provocative 
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defence (or non-offensive defence — NOD) seem to thrive, since they attempt to account for these 
contradictions by reconciling the necessity for national security with the inherent dualities of the 
concept. 
 
At first glance, the approach above contrasts with that of David Chuter (2011), who is inclined to 
think of national security as a series of processes — a project, if you will — rather than as an 
objective or a product.106  However, a closer inspection of this approach reveals that Chuter, too, 
thinks that definitions of security are widely contested, reasons being that there are such vast 
differences in the domestic- and foreign relations environments within which states have to draft 
and execute security policy.  Chuter does not entirely negate the formulation of security objectives 
per se, even when policymakers prefer to sublimate these into national strategic goals.  On this point, 
Buzan considers security to be an intensely political concept, which governments treat with 
circumspection.  In fact, some governments deliberately give themselves political manoeuvring room 
by not developing a security strategy, which allows them expediency to claim national security 
interests when other arguments give way.107  Buzan also confirms two salient characteristics of the 
environment within which public servants make defence policy:  first, he endorses the neorealist 
perspective of an anarchic international political system, within which a society must necessarily 
strive to obtain national security.  International anarchy does not automatically imply chaos and 
disorder, though; lately, it appears to be moving towards a decentralised, interdependent form of 
political order, as the study had previously intimated.108  Second — and more sobering — is the fact 
that, to obtain freedom from threat by others, the anarchic nature of the international system 
obliges its component units to compete among each other, and to be largely self-reliant (if not self-
sufficient).  The security needs of national states, being largely similar and mirror images of each 
other, may plausibly give rise to violent military conflict between them; more certain, however, is the 
fact that competition among states is inevitable within an anarchic international system.  As this 
inter-state rivalry takes concurrent political, economic, societal, and military forms, it furthermore 
implies that the national security of any state can only be expressed relative to that that of another 
state, in any of its forms, and never as an absolute.  National security only has meaning if it 
presupposes successful competition with other states, thereby negating the establishment of an 
international stability regimen premised upon either harmony or hegemony.109 
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6. Positioning Defence within the National Security Debate 
 
Buzan’s theories and the neorealist models are not without contention, though.110  Chuter argues 
that the paranoia and ideological tension of the Cold War may have subsided, but that even 
neorealist views (such as those that Buzan professes) still nurtures two inappropriate ‘mental 
habits.’111  First, Chuter disputes the notion that the states of the world are interminably locked in 
competition with one another; on most issues that affect relations among units within the 
international system, the global actors would, in fact, much rather cooperate than compete.  This 
would hold true for matters of national security, as it would for international economics.  However, 
in conducting this argument Chuter apparently ignores the fact that states will usually cooperate 
with each other only if they calculate it to be in their interest to do so.  He is therefore at odds with 
Buzan’s view that, as long as anarchy exists and national states strive to maintain their independence 
and sovereignty within the anarchic international system, they will be opposing each other at least 
part of the time – but will be competing with each other all of the time.112  On this question, Buzan’s 
theories appear to be the more valid.  
 
Chuter’s second idea, which is more difficult to dismiss offhand, postulates that realism has 
conditioned states to keep searching for (military?) threats, especially those that endanger their 
territorial sovereignty.  He argues that this mind-set feeds paranoia, and that the constant search for 
a threat eventually results in a self-fulfilling prophecy:  “…treating a state or an entity as a threat is a 
good way to turn them into one.” 113  Worse, a threat-dependant approach to the compilation of 
defence policy may invalidate the conceptualisation of the armed forces’ functions, structures, and 
capabilities, resulting in the development of a military establishment that is at odds with reality.  To 
change these mental models, Chuter recommends that states look for (military) tasks rather than 
threats … but then only in stable regions of the globe, where there is no fear of a military attack.  
Buzan, too, admits to having doubts about the unresolvable ambiguity of threats; but then, he 
considers threats within the much wider domain of national security, rather than within the narrow 
context of national defence.114  It is therefore necessary to lift the argument regarding military 
threats and the tasks of armed forces one level higher — from the military strategic to the national 
strategic, in fact.   
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Mandel (1994) argues that states should be aware of national interests at all times, even in the 
absence of threat;  however, the reality appears to be that perceptions of threats, rather than the 
achievement of national goals, shape security agendas.115  External threats are emphasised because 
of the conceptual and bureaucratic gaps between internal and external threats.  For example:  the 
sources and forms of internal security threats differ substantially from those of external threats, and 
requires a different ‘conceptual toolkit’; furthermore, external threats permit contentment with 
one’s own society, while internal threats demand domestic transformation.116  Buzan, too, devotes 
much attention to national insecurity, which he considers to consist of an inseparable combination of 
vulnerabilities and threats that are unique to each country.  States will therefore endeavour to 
minimise their insecurity, either by moderating the threat, or by reducing their vulnerability.117  As 
with Mandel, this approach allows for a dual focus on national security:  outward, in seeking to 
address international threats, and inward towards addressing national vulnerabilities.  An initial 
assessment of Buzan’s method indicates limited value, in that it merely points to national security 
risks on two fronts (internationally and domestically), rather than a singular focus on foreign threats; 
however, adding his concepts of strong and weak states/powers provides further depth and a wider 
scope to the topic under discussion. 
 
When Buzan therefore speaks of a strong or weak state, he is referring to the measure of socio-
political cohesion within a national state: the domestic dimension of vulnerabilities, in other 
words.118  One would begin by defining a potentially weak state as one where a unifying, inspiring 
idea (or sense of national identity) is either diffuse, weakly held or even contested.  Such a state 
could still function as a viable entity, though, but only if its government machinery —the institutions 
of the state, comprising of the legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative bodies, functioning 
within an effective regulatory- and procedural framework — remain strong.119  If the ‘idea’ and the 
‘institutions’ are equally weak, the state becomes highly vulnerable against security threats both 
domestic and foreign.  In contrast to strong states, the weak — not having sufficient societal and 
political consensus internally to ensure cohesion — are highly concerned with internal threats, and 
the security of government.  The general rule seems to indicate that, the weaker the state, the 
greater the confusion between state security and the security of government … and the more 
prominent the role of armed forces in states’ internal security.120  This phenomenon becomes 
problematic in a regional context, because weak states will constantly be exporting their internal 
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instabilities to their neighbours, thereby complicating the establishment of collective security 
agreements.  Buzan is therefore in agreement with analysts such as Mueller (2007) when he avers 
“…that the creation of stronger states is a necessary condition for both individual and national 
security.  The existence of stronger states will not by itself guarantee security, but their continued 
absence will certainly sustain insecurity.”121 
 
More conventionally, Buzan thinks of strong or weak powers in terms of the customary 
differentiation among states, based upon their comparative economic, military, and (presumably) 
diplomatic standing within the international community.122  He elaborates somewhat on this familiar 
concept by repeating that weak powers are so only relative to other states, particularly in 
comparison with their neighbours and the great powers of the era.  From a risk management point of 
view, a country is therefore obliged to emphasize its defence policy and military capability only if it is 
a strong state (has the benefit of robust socio-political cohesion), but is a weak power relative to its 
competitors — a state in the second position, as presented in the model below: 
 
  Socio-political Cohesion 
  Weak Strong 
Power 
Weak 1. Critically vulnerable to security 
threats across a wide spectrum 
2. Vulnerability to foreign military 
threats increased 
Strong 3. Vulnerability to domestic political 
threats is increased 
4. Relatively invulnerable to the 
majority of security threats 
 
Figure 2.1:  Security Threats by Type of State123 
 
Looking at the other quadrants, a state in the first position would hardly be able to emphasize 
defence policy over anything else, while a disproportionate focus on defence matters for a state in 
the third position would only provide temporary mitigation of its real security risks.  The model is 
limited, though, since it focuses on security threats and vulnerabilities only (and therefore makes the 
most sense in a cataclysmic philosophy of war, which deems all armed conflicts to be wars of 
necessity); also, the theory does not explain the discretionary employment of military force, as found 
in a political philosophy of war.  Nevertheless, an analysis of a country’s defence policy publications, 
in parallel with the actual military capabilities that it consequently develops, should provide ample 
evidence of the governing elite’s security mentality at the time when they formulated the particular 
policy’s guiding principles.   
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7. Utilizing Military Power in Modern Statecraft 
 
States often base their opinion of other countries’ national power on perception, rather than reality; 
power is what observers believe it to be, rather than what it actually is in practical application.  The 
doctrine of deterrence, for example, relies mainly upon the attribute of credibility – the perceived 
national will to employ elements of power – rather than upon a state’s actual military capability.124  
Defence policymakers bent upon developing operationally capable militaries therefore need to 
consider that, whereas the instruments of a state’s economic, political, psychological, and 
informational power elements are perpetually in action, the employment of traditional military tools 
in armed combat is a rare event for most nations.  This is even more applicable to a post-Cold War 
world, where states that develop armed forces in the absence of appropriate employment strategies 
soon discover that they are holding their expensive military capabilities in suspended animation most 
of the time.  Furthermore, defence policies are not only resource-dependent, but also predicated on 
the expected or desired scope of force employment:  what the state should employ its military 
capability for, where it needs to do it and how the armed forces have to execute their missions.  The 
processes of force development and force employment are therefore interactive, and both are 
dependant variables of each other.125  From an economic (state resources) point of view, the 
maintenance of a peacetime defence force, which government only employs as an insurance policy 
against the risk of having to conduct an interstate war, does not make much sense.  Nevertheless, 
national states face the fact that, while the primary influence of countries primarily reside in non-
violent means such as negotiation, rewards, sanctions, or threats, the realist paradigm still offers the 
more comprehensive sets of theories and hypotheses about international politics,126 and also 
continues to link national power to military capacity, and the capability to wage war.127  In their 
attempts to reconcile these contradictions, societies that essentially abhor the actual employment of 
military force may nonetheless invest in the creation of those very capabilities, but rather for 
purposes of enhancing their national identity, legitimacy, international status, or diplomatic leverage, 
than for their employment in violent conflict.128  Whatever the case may be, it seems clear that the 
world has been in the throes of a revolution in strategic affairs by the close of the previous century.  
Smith129 and Mueller130 offer further evidence of the changed utility of military power since the end 
of the Cold War.   
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They confirm the view of other authors that there has been a decline in war among states; also, most 
societies appear to be changing their attitudes toward the theoretical concept of war in general and 
actual conduct of warfare in particular.131  At the level of international relations, war no longer 
appears to be a practical way to resolve intractable political problems among national states; at a 
societal level, warfare as a state-sanctioned activity may even have become morally and culturally 
unacceptable, at least insofar as the developed world is concerned.132  Mueller (2007) 133 extrapolates 
the trend, by averring that global society had finally brought the ubiquitous problem of interstate 
war under control, leaving only two ‘remnants of war’ for future relegation.  The first is the civil, 
internal and mostly criminal form of conflict, which is without an overarching political objective in 
the traditional sense of the word (see the first position in Table 2.1); second, the modern 
manifestation of war, which seems to be limited policing wars of discretion, rather than of necessity.  
It is through wars of discretion that major powers attempt to establish regional or global order, 
and/or to protect their national interests.  Flowing from this argument, it follows that modern states 
must have been limiting their options by taking rational decisions not to engage in war — which, 
again, supports the political philosophy of war.134  Mueller offers reasons for the perceived decline of 
inter-state warfare, including the threat of atomic weapons,135 the rise of democracy,136 the 
acceptance of capitalism, scientific methodology, human rights, environmentalism and liberalism — 
all of which he eventually discounts as primary explanations for war aversion.  Mueller then 
concludes that the dissipation of interstate war may be confidently associated with the growing 
number of competent, coherent governments in the developed world, but qualifies his theory with 
one final observation: “…if the people happen to think they want war, they will tend to get it.”137  The 
remark implies that, since autocracies also have domestic constituencies that they must account for, 
the decreasing utility of military coercion, as an instrument of state policy, must necessarily originate 
among the citizenry — at the individual level — and not with government.  In this way, the attitude 
of war aversion within a political context, and the abhorrence of warfare within a cultural context, 
starts with the convictions of a state’s people and ends with its expression in government policy.138  
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While broadly in agreement with the trend outlined above, other writers take a different view of the 
causes and manifestations of the declining utility of military power.  To them, the problem is not the 
willed obsolescence of war as an instrument of state policy, inasmuch as it is the neglect of 
policymakers to grasp that states still base their notions of military power — and their preferred 
structures for their armed forces — on the paradigm of interstate industrial war.139  The end of the 
Cold War left states with inappropriate doctrine, structures, and equipment for the type of 
operations that they now had to conduct.  These operations contain contradictions to industrial-age 
conventional war, such as the fact that the actors are mostly non-state and that military forces no 
longer fight to obtain decisive victories on the battlefield, but rather to preserve their forces and to 
create security conditions in which the political outcome may be decided.140  Whereas before the 
Cold War military forces were developed and employed to achieve decisive outcomes in armed 
conflicts, they were now destined only for deployment in a long-term confrontations.  The objective 
of the latter activity is “…to influence the opponent, to change or form an intention, to establish a 
condition and, above all, to win the clash of wills.”141From this point of view, conventional military 
capabilities — still the primary means of military power — are simply unsuitable for employment in 
support of a modern state’s political objectives.  To have value, they have to adapt their warfighting 
from achieving “…the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those establishing conditions 
in which the outcome may be decided.”142  Military force, employed en masse to defeat equivalent 
capabilities of an enemy, has little remaining utility other than ensuring that the opposition does not 
resort to similar means at short notice.143  Smith therefore advocates a defence policy favouring a 
strategic defence (predicated on a struggle for national survival), 144 and with armed forces capable of 
amelioration, containment, deterrence and (finally) coercion when the risk of violent conflict is 
realised.145  
 
David Chuter contributes to the debate by surmising militaries exist primarily to support the foreign- 
and domestic policies of the national state with force, or the threat of force.146  This description 
speaks to the armed forces’ active participation in the execution of government policy, but does not 
quite come clean about the armed forces’ passive role in the affairs of the state:  militaries also exist 
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to ensure government’s exclusive control of intra-national force.147  Chuter mentions that a state that 
loses its grip on the monopoly of organised violence fails to be a viable entity, because it can no 
longer ensure (military) security for its citizens.  (Although one can agree with the first part of the 
statement, the latter is contestable.  As Buzan has indicated, the governments of weak states in 
particular are wont to employ their militaries to ensure their own security rather than the security of 
the national state.)  The retention of armed forces by countries, even those without any conceivable 
risk or intent of employing force in support of national security, is therefore the clearest possible 
expression of resolve to retain that monopoly.148  However, the mere presence of armed forces is not 
sufficient.  As previously indicated when the study dwelt on the psychology of deterrence:  the 
adversary will only limit their violent options if they perceive an opposing military as being willing 
and able to outfight them.149  This simple fact, so basic that it receives scant attention in the works of 
(for example) Mueller and Smith, was apparently not so obvious in the neoliberal paradigm that 
gathered momentum after the end of the Cold War; it is only lately that the competency of armed 
forces has resurfaced as a factor in the domain of international relations.  Even in benign foreign 
relations environments, capable militaries are conducive to securing influence with major powers 
and regional security organisations.150  On the issue of capability, Chuter ventures further and 
addresses other self-evident truisms, such as the fact that no formula exists whereby one may 
equate the size of military forces with their usefulness in supporting the achievement of a state’s 
political objectives.  With the rapid advances in military technology, for example, numerical 
preponderance only becomes meaningful in symmetric conflicts where all else is equal.151  Fact is, a 
military force’s competence would primarily reside in the quality of its equipment, leadership, 
organisation and training152 ― all of which are issues that should be addressed by defence policy.   
 
In closing this section, Chuter unintentionally provides a theory for a defence paradigm that may 
have relevance for the current study.  First, he avers that the militaries of the West during the Cold 
War epitomized society’s fear of annihilation in a global conflagration; since then, however, those 
sections of society that previously feared and distrusted the armed forces began to grasp the 
potential usefulness of the military.153   Second, Chuter proposes that these changed perceptions 
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lately resulted in “…a routine demand by liberal and humanitarian thinkers, despite the very mixed 
history of such interventions and the suffering and death that usually accompanies such actions” to 
deploy military forces in crises abroad.154  Chuter further asserts “…liberal militarism has largely 
replaced traditional militarism in the discourse of major Western states.”155  Lately, analysts in the UK 
seems to agree that ‘liberal interventionism’ may have reduced in political popularity, but that a firm 
position on national interests and the execution of responsibilities for the maintenance of 
international order may soon see renewed employment of the military.156  Some writers further 
suggest that the universalising ideologies of liberalism and Marxism, rather than those of the state-
centred concepts of realism, are most likely to give rise to notions of crusading imperialism in 
modern times. 157  Since these interventions appear to be versions of Mueller’s limited policing wars 
of choice ― or Gray’s ‘wars of discretion’158 ― they could well arise from revived messianic 
convictions of the global variety:  for the West, the belief in the validity of their political- and 
economic models that is reinforced by military action when deemed necessary.  This notion seems to 
arise from an eschatological philosophy of war, conceptualised through to a neoliberal view of 
international relations, and expressed in the employment of (among others) military force.  It just so 
happens that the West also entertains a military theory that has been notably successful in getting 
the job done. 
 
8. Explaining the Western Way of War 
 
Parker (2005) 159 contends that the western prototype rests upon five pillars, of which the first is a 
heavy reliance upon superior technology.  Biddle (2004) 160 not only agrees with this assertion, but 
also contends that the plethora of new inventions on post-industrial battlefields, and the consequent 
lethality of war, is actually the main driver behind the development of the ‘modern system’.  In their 
attempt to avoid annihilation by weapons with increased firepower, accuracy, and mobility, western 
armies were forced to create complex and interrelated war-fighting models, which utilises “…cover, 
concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent maneuver, and combined arms at the 
tactical level, and depth, reserves, and differential concentration at the operational level of war.”161  
Crucially, Biddle further opines that the modern military system is so complex and resource-intensive 
that few states can implement it fully, and that the gap in real military power is growing between the 
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states that are capable of implementing the system successfully, and those that are not.  However, 
for an army to be incapable of implementing this feature of the modern system does not 
automatically imply that it is incompetent or ineffective at executing its particular mandate. 
 
Biddle emphasises, for example, that attributes of technological superiority and numerical 
preponderance are inadequate predictors for military effectiveness by themselves.  Policy decisions 
based upon these simple, materialist explanations for success are, in fact, likely to overspend on 
force structure and the modernisation of ordnance, while neglecting the training, techniques, and 
practices that are essential in assuring forces’ readiness for employment.162  Parker reinforces this 
approach in his discussion of the second historical pillar of the western way of war:  drill (intensive 
training) and long-term service, which collectively inculcated strong group cohesion and unflinching 
discipline under fire.163  Furthermore, the success of the western way of war is reliant upon a third 
pillar, which premises a liking for precedence, an absence of religious- and ideological constraints, 
and the willingness to accept innovative ideas.  The fourth element, in turn, contends that the 
idealised aim of western strategy has always been the annihilation of opposing armed forces, which 
is in stark contrast with the less severe practises of many other cultures and societies.  Finally, the 
last pillar refers to the West’s pragmatic approach regarding the conservation or adaptation of their 
military practices, as required by circumstances.  In times of demand, western forces were able to 
innovate and expand rapidly from a solid organisational base and, more important, use the extension 
of credit to finance the growth in capability.164  Parker concludes that any state that intends adopting 
the western way of war will be obliged to replicate its social- and economic structure first, to have 
any hope of success.  Merely imitating the model superficially will not do the trick — the required 
changes will, depending upon the distance between the dominant culture of the particular state and 
that of the West, have to be deep and pervasive.165  Brooks and Stanley (2007) validate Parker’s 
views on the development of a western military system, when they elevate his specific example into 
general theory by maintaining that states may develop competent armed forces from a number of 
causal variables that, together, provide a capability framework for a generic military organisation. 
 
9. Presenting a Framework for Analysis 
 
According to Brooks and Stanley, militaries may derive their effectiveness from any combination of 
value-laden sources (causal variables), including a state or society’s culture, its social structure, its 
political- and economic institutions, and international factors such as global ‘mental models’ and 
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competition among states.166  For the implicit values to be realised in martial competencies, 
however, defence management would have to employ strategic devices and processes (denoted 
‘translation mechanisms’ by Brooks and Stanley)167 to influence the development of military 
capabilities.  Translation mechanisms serve to mediate the effects of causal variables at all levels, 
whether the political, strategic, operational or tactical.  However, this study is most interested in the 
instruments employed at the political- and strategic levels of defence activity:  those levels where 
defence leaders “…consult with one another, analyze policy options, and otherwise participate in 
decision making prior to or during an interstate conflict.”168  It is at this level that the governing elites 
conduct strategic assessments, calculate costs and risks, reconcile foreign- and domestic policy 
imperatives … and guide the writing of defence policy that shapes a country’s military capabilities. 
 
From Buzan, one understands that higher-order security policy would have to account for at least 
three referent objects:  the individual citizen, the state, and the international system; also, that one 
cannot isolate the multi-dimensional security risks at any one of the levels from the other.169  South 
African defence policy, for example, provides a constant reference of national leadership’s directive 
attempts to balance the demands of human security, the potential demands of defence against 
aggression, and the discretionary demands of military employment in support of the international 
system.  However, the current study is exclusively concerned with the relationship between defence 
policy and the capabilities of the armed forces, both of which fall primarily within the military-
strategic domain.  Furthermore, the variable of military capability is not a constant:  it is context-
dependant and varies across time, place, and the type of mission that the particular military has to 
execute (or potentially has to accomplish).170  One can also not assume that militaries that are 
competent at one task are equally capable at others; for that kind of flexibility, leadership would at 
least have had to train them, or, depending on the scope of the differences between the missions, 
developed specific military capabilities.  Viewed from this angle, the purpose of defence policy is to 
ensure that the state develops appropriate military capabilities; specifically, that the armed forces 
are structured, organised, trained, and equipped for the strategic environment in which they will 
most likely have to achieve their missions.171  By providing both retrospective evidence of a national 
security strategy (whether declared or emergent), combined with forward-looking direction to the 
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formulation departmental- and military strategy, defence policy publications serve as practical 
expressions of the logic that connects a state’s security paradigm to its military capabilities.   
 
Furthermore, one can expect that every state will have a unique, culturally-biased understanding of 
its particular security- and defence problems, and will therefore develop distinctive policy solutions 
and military capabilities accordingly.  Stephen Biddle has the following to say on this matter:172 
 
“If capability is the ability to succeed at an assigned mission, different states will thus assess 
capability very differently for different forces — no single, undifferentiated concept of 
“military capability” can apply to all conflicts and times.  An analysis must therefore focus on 
a subset of the tasks (accent by researcher) militaries perform, which are in turn a subset of 
the elements of state power.” 
 
At first glance, these arguments seem to preclude the use of a common denominator to render a 
parallel description of a particular defence policy and its related military capabilities with.173  
Nevertheless, closer scrutiny of the above reveals that effectiveness in mission achievement is still 
the prime motive for the development of military capabilities, as it should be in the formulation of 
defence policy.  One would still have to determine, though, whether the concept of military 
effectiveness would serve the same purpose at all levels of military activity.  According to Millett and 
Murray (1990),174 defence forces execute their missions at four intersecting levels:  the political, the 
strategic, the operational, and the tactical.  Considering the two variables that the study is concerned 
with, defence policy will originate at the political level; military capability will arise at the strategic 
level.  Each of the levels are characterised by different actions, procedures and goals, and it is 
contended that militaries cannot be equally and simultaneously effective at every one of the levels.  
Brooks and Stanley175 are therefore of the opinion that the operations research approach to military 
competency is inadvisable, for at least two reasons:  first, because operations research primarily 
focusses on the war mode and the tactical level of war – the outcomes of battles, or the expression 
of fighting power.  Second, the method is primarily fixated on quantitative research, using empirical 
data and measuring effectiveness in terms of material assets, or historical outcomes.  In contrast, the 
structure used by Brooks and Stanley conveniently allows for a study of a defence force that is in 
peacetime mode, focussing primarily on the political- and strategic levels, and adopting a qualitative 
research methodology.   
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Brooks and Stanley further argue that one may describe a military’s capabilities within the 
framework of only four interactive attributes:  integration, skill, quality, and responsiveness.176  They 
define integration as the degree to which different military activities are internally consistent and 
mutually reinforcing, and assumes unity of purpose between force development activities and the 
execution of the military’s roles, functions, and tasks.  Integration reduces wasteful expenditure and 
duplication of effort by focussing military strategy on what is suitable, acceptable, and feasible 
(correlating with Parker’s ‘continuity in military theory’177).  Likewise, Brooks and Stanley equate the 
attribute of skill with a military organisation’s competency to execute its designated tasks against 
objective standards.  Skill is concerned with the inculcation of proficiency through training and 
education, with the ability to assimilate new technology, and with morale and motivation — in other 
words, with considerations of competency and the service orientation of military formations and 
their personnel (Parker:  discipline and training).  The element of quality, on the other hand, is 
concerned with a military’s ability to acquire weaponry and equipment that are not only superior in 
terms of function, but also optimised for the context within which the armed forces will employ 
them.  Quality is associated with cost-efficiency, internal management and procurement processes 
(Parker:  technology and financing).  The last characteristic is that of responsiveness, which refers to 
a military’s ability to customise its activities in the light of its own capabilities (given the nature of 
domestic sources from which those capabilities are derived), the capabilities of adversaries, and 
external constraints.  Suitable policy is especially important in enhancing a military’s responsiveness, 
which Brooks and Stanley considers one of the major properties of effective armed forces.  A 
responsive military, therefore, is “…one that adjusts its operational doctrine and tactics to exploit its 
adversary’s weaknesses and its own strengths” and “…one that adjusts and compensates for external 
constraints, including material, geographic, technological, social-structural, political, or cultural 
limitations in its domestic environment.”178  A responsive defence leadership will continuously scan 
the political- and strategic environment and adjust policy, strategy, doctrine, and processes to 
maintain military effectiveness; in contrast, “(m)ilitaries without responsiveness may lose an 
accurate sense of their particular strengths and weaknesses because of a lack of critical self-
evaluation and of rigorous assessment of the external environment”179 (Parker:  pragmatic changes 
and/or conservation of military practices).  In this way, the organising concepts for the study fall to 
hand readily:  elaborated versions of responsiveness, integration, quality, and skill.   
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Finally, the framework for the subsequent analysis would benefit from the interrogation structure 
proposed by Millet et al, which is comprised of a number of questions that cut across Brooks and 
Stanley’s theoretical framework.180  Although the answers to these questions would not go directly 
towards a description of the delta between the obligations of defence policy and the capabilities of 
the armed forces, they should point to some of the causes for the correlation (or lack of it) between 
the two variables.  In addition, the answers should provide clues as to how realistic and feasible the 
demands of policy in terms of capability development are.  The framework for analysis therefore 
employs the gist of Millett and Murray’s questions at the political level, which primarily deal with 
resource allocation:  defence budgets, industry, technology, and human resources.  Moving down 
one level of military activity to the domain of military strategy, Millet et al provides a number of 
additional lines of enquiry that a researcher could employ in the interrogation of a military’s 
capabilities.181  However, if the study were to advance along this avenue of interrogation, the amount 
of detail required to substantiate a valid conclusion would not only increase vastly, but would also 
become harder to obtain, categorize, and correlate.  In the end, though, one could confidently 
subsume the method postulated by Millett and Murray into Brooks and Stanley’s framework for 
military effectiveness, and use the attributes of responsiveness, integration, quality, and skill as an 
organising structure to describe both defence policy and military capability.  
 
10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that humans create simplified mental frameworks of ‘reality’; that these 
paradigms are value-based, and often collectively held by particular societies.  Furthermore, leaders’ 
images of historical events create cognitive bias, and predispose them to particular reactions when 
faced with challenges in their current environment.  Since these images are not only part of the 
individual’s belief system, but are also conceptually interlinked, they are resistant to change.  
Examples of mental frameworks include beliefs about the causes and effects of armed conflict, which 
range from humankind being a passive victim of circumstances (the cataclysmic philosophy), to 
societies actively employing war as a coercive instrument (the political philosophy).  Mental 
frameworks are also prevalent in constructs of international politics, where variants of idealism and 
realism have been in contestation for more than a century now.  Inevitably, these frameworks find 
expression in a state’s policies, and especially in its defence policy.  Since the end of the Cold War, 
the mental frameworks of societies have evolved further to accommodate at least two new 
influences.  The first is the theory of national security, which has connected national defence with 
individual security in a way that especially the realists could not have foreseen in the previous 
century.  The rise of human security has shifted governments’ focus from striving to establish 
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economic- and military powers, to maximising the cohesion of states as socio-political entities; for 
militaries, from the conduct of war, to the management of security, and onwards to maintaining the 
peace.  Second, the effects of globalisation have resulted in the anarchic system of national states 
migrating towards increasing interdependence and cooperation in a number of domains, including 
the economic and the military.  This has resulted in a reassessment of the utility of military power in 
general — a revolution in security affairs — and of the roles and functions of the armed forces in 
particular — a revolution in strategic affairs. 
 
After the Cold War, there was initially much relief at the mitigation of inter-state war and the 
consequent reduction of defence budgets; however, since then there has been a revived 
appreciation for an adjusted role of the armed forces in — and employment by — enlightened 
societies.  A responsive state would have accounted for these changes in its defence policies, 
generating adjustments throughout the armed forces’ “…leadership and management systems — 
from organisational structure to applied technology, from measures of readiness to measures of 
effectiveness, and from military training systems to professional military education.”182  By this 
reasoning, the study has developed a structure in terms of which it may describe not only the 
relevant South African defence policy publications and their presumed products (the capabilities of 
the SANDF, with a particular interest in those of the SA Army), but also the measure of divergence 
between them.  The next chapter will therefore employ this basic structure as an organising 
framework for its rich description of South African defence policy, as it stood between 2000 and 
2012.    
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Analysing Defence Policy Statements 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A defence policy is neither the outcome of a clear pronouncement of national objectives, nor entirely 
the result of military logic.183  Since defence preparations are also encumbered by a much greater 
degree of uncertainty and unquantifiable risk — in contrast to the planning of other state 
departments (agriculture, economic affairs, or education, for example) — the making of defence 
policy is never a wholly rational process either.184  Huntington185 avers that defence policy is rather a 
political statement of the inevitable interplay between domestic policy, whereby the actions of 
government affect the allocation of values among groups within society, and foreign policy, where 
the allocation of values affect relations between national states.  Stated differently, defence policy is 
a compromise in managing the risks arising in the arenas of two different referent objects for 
security — the individual citizen and groups within society (human security) on one hand, and the 
state as a whole (national security) on the other.  Concern with the former gives rise to structural (as 
opposed to military-strategic) policy decisions:  the size and distribution of the defence budget; the 
composition, numbers and service conditions of defence personnel; the procurement and 
distribution of equipment and commodities to the defence force; the models and processes by which 
the military is organised and administered.186  However, the demands of international politics obliges 
governments to be concerned with the strategic domain as well, since (ideally) military power has 
efficacy only insofar as it assists in achieving a state’s foreign policy goals.  Defence policy should 
therefore also express instrumental- or utilitarian decisions concerning the deployment, 
commitment, and employment of armed forces, thereby reconciling concurrent demands from both 
the domestic- and foreign policy environments, in ways that satisfy security demands of stakeholder 
groups within society and manages international security risks at the same time:187   
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“Domestic politics serves as a constraint on the formulation of policies which are primarily 
responses to the external environment and have their principal impact on that environment.  
Conversely, international politics serves as a constraint on the formulation of policies which 
are primarily responses to the domestic environment and have their principal impact on that 
environment.  With military policy, however, it is almost impossible to say which is the 
primary focus and which the constraint.” 
 
For the first decade after 1994, South Africa’s defence fraternity had to come to terms with rapid, 
post-Cold War paradigm shifts in the worlds of international politics and strategic studies.  At the 
same time, the state as a whole was undergoing political, economic, and social changes of epic 
proportions.  While the essence of defence policy still seemed to reside in its connotation with 
national power and in the use of force in the pursuance of national interests, the security interests of 
the state were bound to be defined differently:  interests that were political, a combination of 
domestic and foreign, and “…the product of a competition of purposes within individuals and groups 
and among individuals and groups.”188  As argued by Mandel,189 South African defence policy would 
theoretically have given explicit recognition of the trade-offs that are invariably involved in managing 
the complex and fluid security environment, with national leaders forsaking any notions of a “fixed, 
linear, monotonic single-dimensioned security policy.”  In assessing such policies, the South African 
public should have anticipated, and accepted, apparent dichotomies in goals and methods, and 
desisted from demanding unidirectional defence policies.  The first sections of this chapter will 
discuss the extent to which these hypotheses hold true, by presenting the actual content and 
implications of South African defence policy in the aftermath of the South African state’s becoming a 
constitutional democracy.  Given the salience of the SA Army in the South African defence 
dispensation190 (and in recognition of the fact that “(i)n future warfare, land power, in key part 
meaning troops on the ground, will continue to be necessary if anything resembling decisive victory 
is to be achieved”191), the second section will present an analysis of the Army’s interpretation of 
defence policy prescripts.  The chapter will thereupon close with a brief description of the latest 
defence policy iteration — the South African Defence Review 2012 — and its implications for future 
force development.192 
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2. National Defence Policy:  Soldiering On from 1996 
 
The mandate of the SANDF (and with it, that of the SA Army) is derived from Chapter 11 of the 
Constitution, which states that it should be structured and managed as a disciplined military force, 
with the “primary object to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in 
accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.”  
In addition, Section 102 (2) of the Constitution authorises the defence force to act in co-operation 
with the police service,193 in defence of the Republic and in fulfilment of an international obligation.  
Since the “objects of the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain 
public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold 
and enforce the law”,194 employment of the SANDF in a similar capacity is also conditionally 
mandated.  By implication, the Constitution makes allowance for any one of the primary referent 
objects for security:  of the individual and society, of the national state and of the international 
community.  The Constitution furthermore defines the ‘ends’ of military security in broad terms, but 
it does not pronounce on the ‘means’ or the ‘ways’ of achieving its objectives.  It leaves the choice of 
these two elements — with all their complexity, interdependencies, and uncertainty — to the 
policymakers:  those who compiled the 1996 White Paper on Defence,195 the 1998 Defence 
Review,196 and the consultative draft of the 2012 South African Defence Review (the latter a recent 
document that will, once adjusted and approved, influence the SANDF’s capability development in 
the future only).197 
 
The 1996 White Paper publication was substantially different from its predecessors in at least two 
respects.  First, it adopted a principle of maintaining the sound civil-military relations that are 
required in a constitutional democracy; second, it was deliberately short on guidance as to the 
structure of the future SANDF.198  The latter deficiency was to be addressed in the Defence Review 
publication, which — in combination with the White Paper — confirmed the national defence 
posture, provided the principles for defence governance in a democracy, defined SANDF’s functions 
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and tasks, and presented its force design.  With regards to the latter, parliament had four proposals 
to select from: 199 
 
 First, an option that reflected a bias towards traditional defence contingencies and relying on 
an arsenal of conventional weaponry, but which acknowledged that the SANDF would be 
involved in a number of secondary tasks.  The model – which cabinet eventually approved - 
was reliant upon the maintenance of a smaller core of full-time forces, with a substantial 
growth capability in times of crises.   
 Second, a more ambitious design, styled the ‘Department of Defence Long Term Force 
Design’200 and founded on Western cultural paradigms (considered synonymous with Biddle’s 
‘modern system’201 in this study) was presented.  This option presupposed traditional 
defence roles and military contingencies, and relied on conventional equipment to an even 
greater extent than the previous proposal.  
 Third, an option that recommended a drastic shift away from conventional military thinking 
towards a realistic consideration of the roles and tasks that the armed forces were 
conducting at the time, and would most likely be involved with in the future.  It argued 
forcefully for an unconventional approach in the formulation of primary defence roles, 
operational concepts, force design, and allocation of budgets.  This implied a reduction of the 
armed forces’ conventional capabilities, shifting towards counter-insurgency and peace 
support (SA Army), coastal protection (SA Navy), and air transport capabilities (SA Air Force).  
A civilian think-tank developed this proposal, but the defence planners of the time were less 
than enthusiastic of the proposal’s implementation. 
 Last, a submission based upon the principles of Non-Offensive Defence that supported a 
similar force design as Option 1, but placed greater emphasis on territorial (rear-area) 
defence, enhanced air defence capabilities, helicopter support to the Army, and inshore 
patrol capabilities for the Navy.202   
 
With parliament accepting the first option and defence policy drafted accordingly, the 1996 White 
Paper and 1998 Defence Review publication thereafter served as constant reference in the future 
development of defence legislation (including the Defence Act, No. 42 of 2002), lower-order policy, 
service doctrine, and — as a consequence of government decisions ostensibly derived from the 
policy — a series of strategic arms acquisition projects that have locked the SANDF into a contestable 
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theoretical model ever since.203  In addition, defence policy provided a vision for the development of 
the SANDF’s military capabilities:  “To ensure, in accordance with the Constitution, effective defence 
for a democratic South Africa, enhancing national, regional and global security, through balanced, 
modern, affordable and technologically advanced defence capabilities.”204  As per the framework of 
analysis developed in the previous chapter, the study henceforth describes defence policy’s desired 
outcomes in terms of the SANDF’s required levels of integration, its quality, skill, and responsiveness.   
 
2.1 Implications for SANDF Capability Development 
 
The degree of integration describes the extent to which the SANDF’s activities are internally 
consistent and mutually reinforcing, and assumes a unity of purpose between its force development 
activities and the execution of the armed forces’ actual (present) or plausible (future) functions 
(Brooks and Stanley, 2007).205  Starting with the 1998 Defence Review at the national-strategic level, 
the publication declares that that “… government has adopted a broad, holistic approach to security, 
recognising the various non-military dimensions of security and the distinction between the security 
of the state and the security of people.  The greatest threats to the security of the South African 
people are socioeconomic problems like poverty and unemployment, and the high level of crime and 
violence.”206  In spite of this unambiguous and realistic policy statement, the Review fails to 
acknowledge both the de facto global revolution in strategic affairs, and the national revolution in 
security affairs, when it states that 
 
“The government has adopted a narrow, conventional approach to defence.  The primary 
function of the SANDF is defence against external aggression.  The other functions are 
secondary.  The Defence Review therefore sets a policy vision for the size, structure, 
weaponry, equipment and funding requirements of the SANDF, mainly on the basis of its 
primary function.  Where the self-defence capabilities are insufficient for certain secondary 
functions — such as peace support operations and internal deployment in co-operation with 
the SAPS — additional capabilities may be required.”207   
 
A further elucidation of defence’s integration is found in Chapter 9 of the Defence Review, where it 
describes the fundamental concepts underlying the transformation of the DOD’s administrative- and 
command structures:  a systems approach to the management of defence; operational 
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synchronisation (or ‘jointness’) among the services; a singular focus on the core business of defence 
and the out-sourcing of non-core functions; civilianisation where uniformed posts are not required; a 
commitment to the part-time component; last, the exploitation of information technology.208  An 
SANDF complying with the demands of policy should manage the risk of a foreign, armed invasion 
virtually all of the time, and actually deploy and conduct operations in this role most of the time.  
 
In turn, the SANDF’s level of skill (as used in this study) would be associated with the organisation’s 
competency to execute its designated tasks, and relates to its inculcation of job proficiency through 
education, training, and personnel development.  It also speaks to the organisation’s ability to 
assimilate new technology and includes emotive factors such as motivation, morale, and the military 
ethos (Brooks and Stanley, 2007).  Furthermore, skill is also associated with intensive training (drill) 
and long-term service, which in combination inculcates an institutional culture that is premised upon 
effectiveness, strong group cohesion, and unflinching discipline under fire (Parker, 2005).  Chapter 3 
of the 1996 White Paper provides detailed prescripts in this regard, stating that the SANDF will use 
international benchmarks of competency; that the preparation of personnel to execute the SANDF's 
primary function of defence against external military aggression is the essence of its training ethos; 
and that specific training programmes (i.e. not part of the generic training regimen) will be 
introduced to prepare military personnel for regional security co-operation, and involvement in 
international peace support operations.209  Much is also made of the inculcation of “… respect for 
human rights, the rights and duties of soldiers, the rule of law, international law, nonpartisanship 
(sic), non-discrimination, and civil supremacy over the armed forces.”210  The 1998 Defence Review 
continues in much the same vein, by stating that the SANDF must prepare to execute self-defence by 
training personnel for conventional operations, and exercising its units and formations in all-arms, 
joint, and combined operations.211  In considering operations other than war, it is only training for 
peace support operations that receives special mention, since “(p)eace support operations are 
fundamentally different from traditional approaches to fighting wars.  The differences are manifest in 
the mission, objectives and doctrine of these operations, and in the role and tasks of the forces 
involved therein.”212  Chapter 10 also contains a detailed section on education and training, focussing 
very much on a novel (more scientific) methodology, a national accreditation- and qualification 
system, and combined (international) training opportunities.213  To comply with policy requirements, 
the SANDF should therefore be educated, trained, and motivated to match international benchmarks 
for military professionalism.  
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The extent of the SANDF’s quality — as defined in the organising structure of the study — has a 
bearing on its ability to acquire equipment and weaponry that are not only superior in terms of 
designed functionality, but that are also optimised for the context within which ordnance are to be 
employed (Brooks and Stanley, 2007; Parker, 2005).  From the 1998 Defence Review, it is apparent 
that the SANDF would be aspiring to technology that is both appropriate and affordable.  Guiding this 
approach is the expectation that, in the light of rapid technological development worldwide, future 
enemies may possess sophisticated means; furthermore, the fact that South Africa’s regional 
obligations will require the maintenance of a relatively high level of technological sophistication.214  
As with the attributes of integration and skill, the element of quality associates closely with the 
primary function of defence against external aggression.  Chapter 8 of the Review, in dealing with 
force design options, therefore reiterates that effective defence for South Africa will be ensured “… 
through balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced defence capabilities”215, which 
for all intents and purposes restricts military technology development to the conventional warfare 
domain.  However, paragraph 8 to 13 of Chapter 8 also contains a number of caveats, the application 
of which could have resulted in the enhancement of the SANDF’s quality dimension.  It is argues that 
the processes and assumptions underlying the force design will be subject to periodic revision; that 
continuous adjustments to defence planning will be required; that the costing of the force design 
must include upgrades and replacement, so as to ensure its long-term sustainability; that each 
procurement project will be subject to a trade-off between required capabilities (associated with the 
‘ends’ of force development), the equipment available to the SANDF, and the defence budget (the 
‘means’).216  South African Defence policy is therefore demanding of modern and technologically 
advanced equipment for conventional operations, but it is equally insistent upon the regular 
adaptation of force design to the operational, technological, and financial contexts within which the 
acquisitions are to proceed.  Since the Review concludes with a comprehensive set of guidelines on 
defence industry and military technology, the issue of quality seems to be well covered.  However, 
managing armed forces and conducting military operations is ultimately a practical matter, as much 
of a science as it is an art.  It is this demand for pragmatism that brings the study to the last 
characteristic of an effective military:  the attribute of responsiveness, which cuts across integration, 
skill, and quality.  Since responsiveness is mainly concerned with the ‘means’ employed by strategy, it 
is more easily quantifiable, has a strong bearing on the feasibility of military planning, and is 
consequently worthy of a section on its own.   
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2.2 Implications for SANDF Responsiveness 
 
In this study, the attribute of responsiveness refers to the SANDF’s ability to tailor its activities to the 
limits of its own capabilities (which includes the consideration of the domestic resource constraints), 
the extent of adversaries’ capabilities, and the bounds imposed by external factors (Brooks and 
Stanley, 2007).  In the absence of plausible adversaries, the SANDF after 1994 had the luxury of only 
considering the limits of its own capabilities and the restrictions of international politics when it 
conducted its strategic thinking for the future.  Consequently, the 1998 Defence Review concluded 
that the SANDF’s force design should revolve chiefly around the SANDF’s primary function of defence 
against military aggression, and that it should account for three factors:  the level of defence 
required; the approved defence posture, and the defence budget.217  The level of defence is 
characterised by the type, scale and intensity of military operations associated with defence tasks 
and –contingencies, as described in Chapters 3 of the Defence Review.  Of note is the fact that 
defence tasks include the promotion of regional security through defence co-operation within the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) framework, and the promotion of international 
security through participation in peace operations.  Chapter 2 describes the approved defence 
posture.  It proposes that the state shall pursue national security chiefly through the realization of 
the political, economic, social, and cultural rights and needs of South Africans, and through efforts to 
promote and maintain regional security.  The Review reinforces the approach by pronouncing that 
the country shall strive for generous political, economic, and military co-operation with Southern 
African states in particular; that the SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture, 
and that South Africa neither had at the time, nor would it have in the future, aggressive intentions 
towards any state.218  In short, the South African defence theory espouses the strategic end of 
deterrence, employing an explicit set of ways. 
 
First, South Africa will seek military co-operation with other states, to the extent that potential 
aggressors will face a combination multi-national military capabilities in response.  Second, 
indigenous capabilities to neutralize external threats should be at readiness levels proportionate with 
the lead time for such threats to develop.  Third, the SANDF will pursue deterrence against potential 
short-term aggression through immediate force readiness, and also in the longer term by maintaining 
the capability for expansion.219  According to Le Roux (2007), 220 one can therefore arrange the 
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hierarchy of defence in order of priorities, as follows:  prime, the prevention of conflict and war (an 
outcome of political- and economic cooperation, but including defence collaboration in multi-
national deterrence); one order down, the containment of conflict and war (doubtlessly through 
multi-lateral peace support operations); last, the employment of armed forces in combat operations. 
Insofar as force development is concerned, this policy hierarchy suggests that the SANDF should first 
focus on those military formations committed to the collective security structures (the SADC and 
AU), then on those expeditionary forces that it chooses to provide for peace support operations, and 
last on capabilities that could conceivably be used in something like a conventional war.  Within 
these parameters, the Review accepts that, while policy aims at providing the best value for money, 
a restrictive defence budget may result in an imbalance or inadequacy in defence capabilities — a 
security risk, in other words.221 
 
As with perils in any other venture, decision-makers should manage risks through a combination of 
acceptance, deflection, mitigation, or elimination, which in this case implies a responsive interaction 
between political judgement and military expertise.  Accordingly, the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 
Defence Review is replete with references of managing the balance between defence budget and 
military capabilities (the White Paper devotes the whole of Chapter 7 to it) and the impact of 
financial restrictions (Chapter 8 of the Defence Review, especially).  As a whole, one can therefore 
not fault the intended responsiveness of South African defence policy:  it not only provides for its 
own regular revision,222 but also for an SANDF that is responsive to the budgetary means allocated to 
it.  However, there is more to the attribute of responsiveness than has been discussed thus far.  It 
also features indirectly in a description of ‘the western way of war’, of which the South African 
defence policy is apparently a proponent.223  It connotes with a reliance upon the conservation or 
adaptation of successful military practices, as required by circumstances; likewise, with a bias 
towards successful precedents, an absence of religious- and ideological constraints, and the 
willingness to accept innovative ideas (Parker, 2005).  When viewed from this angle, the idea of 
strategic responsiveness moves away from a quantitative calculation of ‘means’ towards a qualitative 
assessment of the ‘ways’.  The policymaker’s challenge thus became clear:  how would one subsume 
the political ideologies, strategic cultures, and military practices of armed forces as disparate as the 
SADF (subscribing to manoeuvre warfare) and MK (espousing people’s war) into a unified SANDF, if 
both organisations were tacitly convinced that their particular biases were the valid ones — and 
therefore equally impervious to cultural change? 224  
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As it turns out, the 1996 White Paper spends the whole of Chapter 2 on the challenge of 
transformation, but dwelling primarily on aspects of human security, the role of defence in a 
democracy, and international law on armed conflict; in the same vein, the sections on military 
professionalism, education, and training are concerned with the political and ethical dimensions of 
military professionalism only.225  The White Paper, in fact, does not provide any guidance on specific 
military practices or the achievement of military effectiveness at all.  The Defence Review, on the 
other hand, states that the manner in which the SANDF will fulfil its tasks arises from the national- 
and foreign policy of government, the provisions in the Constitution, and the White Paper on 
Defence regarding the posture and functions of the SANDF.  The most important considerations are 
that South Africa shall abide by international law on armed conflict, and that the SANDF shall have a 
primarily defensive orientation and posture.226  On the proposed method for dealing with 
contingencies (Chapter 3), the Review is equally vague and confines itself to higher-order concepts 
such as threat-independent approaches, readiness levels, and lead times.  In the end, the most 
succinct expression of policy intent comes from the chapter on the part-time component (PTC), 
where the following is stated:  “The transformation of the SANDF, including the PTC, should be 
addressed in respect of cultural transformation, representativeness and recruiting and retention.  
The main aim is to foster a common military culture amongst all members of the SANDF, whether 
full-time or part-time component.”227 
 
One needs to provide an explanation for the dearth of policy guidance on military ‘ways’ at this point 
of the study, because it is crucial to understand some of the consequences that the thesis explores in 
the next chapter.  While the 1996 and 1998 defence policy publications do not pronounce on the 
force employment doctrine of the SANDF directly, it was inevitable that the methods of the former 
SADF ― which had been aspiring to Biddle’s ‘modern system’ prior to 1994 already ― would have 
had to serve the purpose.  Aside from what Williams calls “the strong ascriptive affinities that exist 
between many armed forces of the developing world and the intellectual discourses of the former 
(mainly Western) colonisers”,228 the bulk of the tactics, techniques, and practices of the non-
statutory forces — an especially those at the operational level of warfare — could simply not be 
reconciled with the expectations of defence policy.  Furthermore, the continuation of the former 
SADF’s successful military practices was encouraged by the fact that, at the time that defence 
introduced the new policy, that organisation’s command structure was still very much in charge and 
using pre-existing infrastructure, instructors, and training institutions to conduct its force 
development with.  However, one could also argue that this explicit conversion of (especially) the 
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revolutionary forces to a new paradigm was merely a pragmatic, tactful, face-saving illusion ― a 
utilitarian construct, which stakeholders superficially maintained to enhance all participants’ self-
worth, to avoid defensive responses, to encourage the relationship-building process, and ultimately 
to ensure the successful melding of the former forces into one unified institution.229  In situations 
such as these, an organisation’s adoption of new, shared mental models is impeded by existing 
cultural rules regarding interaction and communication, which dictate that actors will readily sacrifice 
collaboration and understanding to preserve their reputations.230  To this end, each of the integrating 
forces were ostensibly treated as if they were at the same level of military professionalism, had 
equally viable military doctrines, and were equally successful in achieving their military objectives:  a 
necessary machination, given that the revolutionary forces had clearly won the political struggle and 
were now in power despite the former SADF remaining undefeated in war.  Given the adage that it 
often takes defeat to force substantive adaptation to the actual conditions of war,231 one may well 
ask which of the two antagonists (the apartheid forces or the liberation fighters) consequently 
perceived themselves to have been either the vanquished or the victorious, and were therefore 
obliged to adjust to a new security setting.  This study therefore argues that, in the absence of 
consensus on what construes successful military practices and successful precedents, defence policy 
did not deliberately conserve any particular military tradition.  The study also maintains that this 
omission was bound to confound the SANDF indefinitely in compiling a suitable, acceptable, and 
feasible force development strategy:  an assertion that it interrogates in the next section, through a 
description of the SA Army’s efforts to devolve national defence policy down to service level.   
 
3. SA Army Vision 2020:  Professing Inspiration from 2006 Onward 
 
By the middle of 2004, the SA Army had largely achieved its objectives of integrating the former 
military forces and establishing a new organizational structure; incidentally, it also found itself with a 
new Chief of the Army and many fresh challenges, but still without an explicit vision and strategy for 
its future.232  The SA Army therefore took a unilateral decision to develop a concept policy 
(provisionally called the ‘SA Army Vision 2020’) that it could employ to guide its future strategy.  An 
in-house project team was appointed in September 2004, commenced with its first workshop in 
January 2004 and by the end of 2006 had produced two first-edition publications of note, viz the 
‘Strategic Profile of the SA Army 2020’ and the ‘SA Army Strategy 2020’.233  The purpose of the Profile 
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was to ”create an ideal, ambitious and clear picture of the future to which the SA Army members 
should be committed to achieve enthusiastically”,234 while the aim of the Strategy was not explicitly 
stated, but is assumed to have been intended as a first iteration of the SA Army’s future strategy 
agenda.  In spite of the fact that the policy venture remained unsupported and without authorisation 
above service level, derivatives of these publications eventually assumed the status of dogma within 
the Army.  These artefacts — collectively denoted henceforth as ‘Vision 2020’ — provide solid 
evidence of the Army’s interpretation and expression of defence policy, thereby contributing 
substantially towards solving the research problem of this study.  As with the previous section, the 
following description will sequentially address the attributes of integration, skill, and responsiveness 
(but leaving quality aside, both for the sake of brevity and due to the limited attention that Vision 
2020 devotes to it).  This section also differs from the previous, in that it is more ambitious and 
progresses from a mere description towards a more critical analysis.  
 
3.1 Army Focus on Integration and Skill  
 
With the appearance of Vision 2020 in 2006 (a decade after the publication of the White Paper), the 
Army indicated that it would primarily be employed beyond the country’s borders in peace support 
or stability operations. 235  This prediction is in stark contrast to the armed forces’ primary role as 
envisaged by the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review.  The raison d’être of the Army 
seems to have shifted, from defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity towards compliance 
with perceived international (African) obligations, and with the Chief of the Army writing that “(t)he 
SA Army must ensure combat-readiness to honour South Africa’s political commitments as part of 
the African Union’s Standby Force (ASF) and specifically the South African Development Community’s 
Brigade (SADC Brig).”236  The Army was quite frank in recognising that the imperatives to employ 
forces in peace- and stability operations were at odds with the obligations of the Constitution, which 
apparently demands a more conventional war-fighting capability.237  However, Vision 2020 dispelled 
any notions of integrating the Army’s activities in a new direction.  Being patently unable to direct its 
force development towards the singular ends and ways prescribed by the White Paper and the 
Defence Review, the Vision concluded that Army forces would be cultivated and deployed to satisfy 
the demands of both operations other than war (OOTW), being a political objective, and war-fighting 
as a constitutional obligation.  If the Army had been able to implement this decision since then, the 
design of a force structure to accommodate the dual mandate was bound to become a major 
challenge,238 as would have been the development of equipment, the conceptualisation of 
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administrative- and logistic systems and (especially) the inculcation of a governing military ethos.  
Under such conditions, operational integration would hardly have been possible.  Instead, Vision 
2020 again emphasised conventional training as the foundation of its force preparation strategy,239 
but at the same time assumed that a conventional war was highly improbable, and that this risk will 
be mitigated in time by the development of a suitable capacity within the reserves.  For the present 
and for the foreseeable future, Vision 2020 therefore anticipated that the SA Army would mainly 
deploy in peace- and stability operations, where the infantry battalions of the regular force would 
bear the brunt of active military service.240  This is a significant departure from the theory of the 
White Paper and the Defence Review, and in practice had the potential to ensure a much better 
alignment between the Army’s force development activities and its operational demands (though 
other analysts may differ from this assessment).241   
 
On the issue of skill, Vision 2020 made much of three developmental challenges, being the desired 
quality of human resources,242 of the effective education, training, and development (ETD) of the 
recruited personnel,243 and of the warrior ethos to be inculcated in future soldiers of the SA Army.244  
With reference to the first issue, Vision 2020 emphasised that the effective management of the 
Department of Defence’s HR Strategy 2010 was a prerequisite for assuring the SA Army of young, 
healthy, and well-trained soldiers, but without excluding the contribution of older personnel.245  This 
is the very same supporting strategy that the SANDF drafted to guide it in becoming the organization 
described in the 1998 Defence Review, and that the Joint Standing Committee on Defence subjected 
to a barrage of protests on 26 February 2003 already.246  Apart from a healthy dose of suspicion that 
the DOD was attempting to purge the newly-integrated non-statutory forces from its ranks, the 
committee apparently based its objections upon the purported absence of any link between the 
DOD’s human resources strategy and the SANDF’s combat readiness.  The second skills 
developmental issue refers to the statement that, to support ‘national strategic deterrence’, the 
force preparation of both the SA Army’s regulars and the reserves must be of high quality.247  The 
point was further made that the regulars – the full-time, professional component that does strategy 
and tactics for a living – and the reserves – the part-time component to be readied for conventional 
operations – were to be totally integrated in all respects to “…form a professional, capable and able 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.usaraf.army.mil/documents_pdf/READING_ROOM/New_partnership_for_a_new_era.
pdf). 
239
  SA Army November 2006 op cit p 4-5. 
240
  Ibid, pp 4-23 to 4-26. 
241
  Baker, D. op cit p 19. 
242
  SA Army November 2006 op cit pp 5-3, 5-15, 5B-4, 5D-8, and 6-3. 
243
  Ibid, pp 5-1, 5-7 and 5-14. 
244
  Ibid, pp 5B-10, 5C-17 and 5C-24. 
245
  SA Army June 2006 op cit p 12. 
246
  Notes on a Meeting of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence dd 26 February 2003 (available 
at http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20030225-human-resource-strategy-2010-briefing). 
247
  SA Army November 2006 op cit p 5-1. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Analysing Defence Policy Statements 
- 51 - 
force…”248  Since modern systems combat is tremendously complex and require highly competent 
soldiers for successful execution, the regular forces and the reserves would both have had to be 
trained and kept current at the same levels; this, at a time when “(s)ocial imbalances, the poor 
education system, and developments in technology produce matriculants who lack military required 
physical and mental skills.”249  Through the deployment of suitable education, training and 
development (ETD) systems, Vision 2020 sought to correct these deficiencies on the SA Army’s 
human resources input side.  However, by 2006 the Army was already short of funds to conduct 
intensive field training exercises for regular forces, which is a critical requirement for the successful 
deployment of a ‘modern system’.250  Even while it was writing the embryonic policy, the Army must 
have known that there was every chance of it defaulting on its aim of being homogeneously 
comprised of a regular- and reserve workforce that could serve in a “…balanced, modern, affordable 
and technologically advanced military force, capable of conducting its tasks and missions effectively 
and efficiently.”251 
 
Furthermore, some of the emotive issues that had the potential to affect the Army’s level of skill 
detrimentally — such as its diverse ethnic mix, its culture, and its desired military ethos — also made 
cameo appearances in Vision 2020.  With reference to the last-mentioned, Vision 2020 centred upon 
the ‘warrior ethos’.252  As far as the officer corps is concerned, the Vision associated the desired 
military ethos with normative values such as discipline, acceptance of hierarchical authority, rules of 
public and private behaviour, and a system of sanctions.253  Vision 2020 also required leaders who 
conduct their business according to a military- rather than a bureaucratic ethos, which implies a 
preference for a professional- rather than a machine bureaucracy.254  In principle, there would have 
been much to recommend this policy approach to an armed force that was facing a plausible 
adversary, that had little regard for office politics, that was predisposed towards content (not form), 
action (not process), bonding (not consultation), conforming (not consensus) and effectiveness (not 
efficiency).  However, the SA Army of 2006 was experiencing cultural- and ethical contradictions — 
“disequilibrium between training and education”, for example — that appeared intractable to 
resolution.255  Furthermore, adherence to a functional warrior ethos also demands personal sacrifice, 
courage, comradeship, service to a higher cause, commitment, passion, and the subordination of 
personal needs:  value preferences that South African society at large seems, at best, to be 
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ambivalent about.256  In conclusion of this discussion on integration and skill, Vision 2020 therefore 
appears to have been rather ambitious in prescribing a dual operational focus and a traditional 
warrior ethos for the SA Army.  Ominously, it also took abundant cognizance of the consequences of 
an already-deficient budget on the SA Army’s future strategy.257  
 
3.2 Army Response to Resource Challenges  
 
Amidst the inspirational language, Vision 2020 was therefore replete with remarks to the effect that 
the Army could only implement related strategies if authorities increased its budget; that the skewed 
ratio between cost for personnel, capital acquisition, and operations needed correction; and that it 
could not effect proper force preparation without budgetary adjustments.  The document made no 
bones about the fact that the SA Army would, to remain relevant and viable as an instrument of the 
state, have to “… transform its current way of doing business in order to be more effective, efficient, 
economical …”258  On the matter of how these management challenges were to be responded to, 
though, the Vision is silent.  It provides no options in resolving the evident mismatch between the SA 
Army programme and the resources available to sustain it, as would have been the practice in 
developed countries.259  One possible reason for this apparent lack of responsiveness could be that 
the Army has been – and conceivably still is – constrained in its formulation of policy options by the 
value system of its planners: a military culture which ironically is not only a major determinant of 
everything that they do, but also so pervasive and deeply inculcated that they are oblivious of the 
restrictions that it places on their freedom of choice.260  If this were true, Army force structure 
planners could easily fall victim to two common fallacies, of which the first is also visible in the 1998 
Defence Review:  the follow-on fallacy, which postulates that the organization should replace current 
equipment with something similar, but better; and the like-for-like fallacy, which demands that a 
potential competitor’s inventory be mirrored in one’s own.261  What, then, could prudent 
policymakers have done to resolve the obvious ends-ways-means conundrum that the Army was 
facing? 
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The most obvious — and incidentally also the most productive — option would have been to achieve 
a better balance between the Army’s real-world commitments and allocated resources.262  Apart 
from increasing its funding (the interminably-delayed option aspired to by Vision 2020) or making the 
Army more efficient in business terms (which could have been politically unpalatable), the Army 
could have reduced its military strategic ‘ends’,263 arranged its objectives in pragmatic order of 
priority, and have accepted the (highly implausible) risk of having to conduct regular warfare.  Vision 
2020 is certainly cognizant of this potential response in theory, arguing that the SA Army should use 
the hiatus in armed conflict to prepare itself for future challenges.264  With the Army being 
strategically on the defensive (but intending to be operationally and tactically on the offensive),265 
Vision 2020 envisaged at least a two- to five year lead time before the SANDF would have had to 
engage a conventional military threat in combat.  During this time, the Army would be developing its 
conventional forces — primarily located in the reserves — from its latent status into its full 
capacity.266  However, Vision 2020’s focus on obtaining responsiveness through the employment of 
conventional reserves is highly questionable.  In the first instance, a conventional threat may arise 
much more rapidly than foreseen, if a major international actor is involved; in this scenario, unlikely 
as it is, a ‘deliberate self-defence strategy’ that is based upon the embryonic reserve force ability 
becomes a matter of being too little and too late, and therefore futile.  Second, in the case of 
regional military threats — which are equally inconceivable, given the development of Africa’s 
collective security architecture267 — one has to consider that economics almost always decide the 
outcomes of arms races and prolonged conventional conflicts.  As a regional power, South Africa 
would easily be able to outpace and outlast any aggressor, or combination of aggressors, among the 
countries within reach of its borders by merely accelerating the development of its regular military 
formations:  again, arguments that run counter to the approach of maintaining capable conventional 
reserve forces.  Last, it is highly unlikely that resources will, at a time of mounting international 
tensions preceding a conventional ‘self-defence’ as envisaged by Vision 2020, be diverted from the 
hard-pressed regular forces towards the energetic reconstruction the conventional reserves.268 
 
To make matters worse, a conventional military strategy aims at limiting the cost of war by engaging 
the opponent with superior military force, and obtaining a decisive victory as quickly as possible; in 
contrast, the counter-insurgent (or peacekeeper, for that matter) should employ a variety of state 
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instruments synchronously in a protracted struggle for supremacy.269  This truism is recognized in 
Vision 2020, which sees conventional forces concluding “operations swiftly and decisively within a 
broad timeframe of 120 days after deployment” through conducting a series of high-intensity 
operations, at a high tempo.270  In addition, Vision 2020 is biased towards the employment of the 
military as early as possible in preventative self-defence, so as to “…capitalise on surprise, to 
conclude operations swiftly and decisively, and to decrease or eliminate the effects of an enemy 
response”,271 and continues to emphasise the need for a rapid force concentration and initial 
deployment to the specific theatre of operations272 — all of which militate against the long-term view 
adopted by Vision 2020 for the development, deployment and employment of the conventional 
reserves.  While a plausible assessment of the security context seems to guide the Army’s de facto 
policy statement, the publications do not provide a viable response to the ends-ways-means 
challenge.  At best, they recognise the existence of the need for responsiveness by averring that 
“…implementing the aforementioned strategy will require bold, brave and well-calculated decisions 
and implementation if the SA Army wants to be successful and achieve its future objectives.”273  At 
worst, Vision 2020’s policy response to a limited resource allocation seems to boil down to nothing 
more than a culturally biased, flawed274 exercise in strategy formulation:  another tentative 
hypothesis that appears to be ready for testing in the next section of the study.   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The chapter above has argued that the establishment of South Africa’s constitutional democracy 
coincided with the end of the Cold War; consequently, that the country’s new government 
simultaneously had to deal with major discontinuities in both the international- and domestic 
political systems.  With reference to the former, the realist theory of international politics and its 
approach to the maximisation of (especially) military power came under pressure, while domestically 
the prominence of the armed forces in national security debates reduced substantially.  Riding the 
global wave of resurgent optimism, the South African defence community, too, took a new course:  
drafting a national defence policy that consisted of two publications in quick succession, viz the 
White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996 and the South African 
Defence Review, 1998.  These policy documents mainly have an inward, structural focus, in that they 
                                               
269
  Drew, D.M. and Snow, D.M. 2006.  Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy:  An Introduction to 
Modern National Security Processes and Problems.  Maxwell AFB:  Air University Press, pp131 – 
149. 
270
  SA Army November 2006 op cit p 4-6.   
271
  Ibid, p 4-7.  
272
  Ibid, p 4-10. 
273
  Ibid, p 6-18. 
274
  For an example of the potential pitfalls in strategy-making, see:  Mintzberg, H. 1991.  The Design 
School:  Reconsidering the Basic Premises of Strategic Management.  In:  Engineering 
Management Review, Vol 19, No 3, Fall 1991, pp 85 - 102. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Analysing Defence Policy Statements 
- 55 - 
express the relationship between state and defence, the implications of defence in a democracy, the 
posture, roles, doctrine, force design, and the administrative processes of defence.  To a more 
limited extent, though, the defence policy also contains instrumental decisions concerning the 
deployment, commitment, and employment of armed forces.  South African defence policy also 
appears to be derivative of a cataclysmic philosophy of war:  forever forsaking any aggressive 
intentions towards any other country, avoiding any impression of military superiority, professing to a 
purely defensive strategy (albeit with retention of the capability to go on the offensive, at the 
operational level of warfare), and declaring willingness to engage in combat only as a measure of last 
resort.  Its accent on the prevention of conflict, multilateralism, and collective defence places it firmly 
in the liberal/idealist tradition, while defence policy’s choice of the individual citizen as the referent 
object for security is an indication of government’s redefinition of threats to the state — a 
recognition of South Africa’s position as a relatively strong power, but as a weak state (in Buzan’s 
parlance).  In contrast, approved defence policy publications, and the SA Army’s effort through Vision 
2020 a decade later, made statements of force development ends (the ability to defend the country 
against an armed invasion from abroad) that seem to contradict these intentions.  Policy guidance 
officially places the ‘primary mission’ at the top of the pile, and relegates all other functions to 
secondary commitments.  For the purposes of the study, defence policy publications also provided a 
point of departure for the assessment of the SANDF’s peacetime effectiveness, using the criteria of 
integration, skill, quality, and responsiveness.   
 
The analysis conducted in this chapter indicates that defence policy makes more than adequate 
provision for the enhancement of the attributes listed above, with the possible exception of 
responsiveness (the latter being particularly questionable in the Army’s Vision 2020).  It also hints at 
the possibility of a dichotomous organisational culture for the country’s defence community.  The 
next chapter will therefore dwell on the extent to which the SANDF has conformed to the 
requirements of defence policy in practice, through a description of the armed forces’ actual 
capabilities at this time.  This analysis has not arrived a moment too soon, for government had 
announced another new vision for the SANDF on 17 May 2012.275  After many years of apparent 
neglect, the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans had presented a draft Defence Review again, 
raising expectations that South African defence policy is on the verge of only its second major 
adjustment since 1994.  While an interrogation of the minister’s speech does not reveal any 
information on the SANDF’s military effectiveness (the primary decisions taken in activating the new 
dispensation ranges from adjusting salaries, through to the establishing of crèches or pre-schools at 
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military bases, and onwards to the establishment of a military ombudsman for the purpose of 
managing grievance procedures), the draft 2012 Defence Review appears to be much more 
informative on matters of mission-readiness.  The study will continue to interrogate this perception 
in the forthcoming chapter. 
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Assessing Defence Policy Outcomes  
 
1. Introduction 
 
When judging the effectiveness of a modern military, whether serving in deterrence mode or actively 
involved in armed conflict, size does not count for much.  Acquiring substantive military capabilities 
for their own sake no longer generates secure areas of influence for a state, nor does it ensure 
success at coercing a competitor; in fact, the financial cost and international responsibilities accruing 
to disproportionate military power has escalated prohibitively, while intangibles such as the quality 
of training and command, control, and communications have proven to be at least as important as 
the concrete attributes of force size and weapons sophistication.276  This does not mean that 
command over capable armed forces is without any benefit to the state, though.  Mandel, for one, is 
of the opinion that, while the salience of military threats to national survival may have declined 
substantially since the end of the Cold War, there are still valid reasons for the maintenance of 
military forces:277   
 
“…some forms of persistent international behaviour require for effective management the 
credible threat of military action.  Even though conventional deterrence doctrine has less 
relevance and effectiveness in the post-Cold War world — due to increasing ambiguity and 
subtlety of the nature of threats, enemies and aggression — military capacity to respond to 
these challenges in innovative ways seems important during peacetime as well as wartime.  
The core of this argument is not that the application of military force in violent warfare is 
essential or effective; preparedness rather than use is what is crucial.  Anarchic conflict in 
the global arena appears to demand dramatic change in military capability, not its 
elimination.”278  
 
For a state’s defence policy to result in military capabilities, government would have had to translate 
its intentions into strategies and plans.  It is common knowledge that a strategy is most often 
expressed in terms of its Ends + Ways + Means, where the ends are the objectives (the ‘what’) that 
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the strategy wishes to accomplish; the ways are the strategic concepts and methods (the ‘how’) of 
applying the means; and the means are the resources, assets, and capabilities used to attain the 
ends.  What policymakers sometimes seem to understand less well, though, is that there is an 
interdependent relationship between the three elements of strategy:  if any one of these are fixed, 
either one or both of the others should be adjusted to keep the venture in balance.279  While the 
achievement of desired strategic outcomes are invariably dogged by a measure of uncertainty, the 
risk of failure increases exponentially if — for example — one fixes the means of executing the 
strategy without adjusting the ends and/or ways to suit.  Simply stated, Ends = Ways + Means + 
Risk,280 which is an equation that all project managers, seeking to balance the dimensions of Quality, 
Time and Cost in a similar fashion, are intimately familiar with.281  One may therefore judge the 
success of strategists — or policymakers, for that matter – by the extent to which they achieve this 
equilibrium.   
 
As explained in the previous chapter, the makers of South African defence policy were apparently 
acutely aware of the need to bring the ends and ways of policy in balance with a fixed budget.282  
They would also have been painfully conscious of the fact that the allocation of the defence budget is 
ultimately a political decision, constrained not only by the size of the economy, but also by public 
opinion and competing domestic priorities for funding.283  Furthermore, since the SANDF had 
inherited the force structure of the former SADF (the maintenance and support of which implied 
fixed financial commitments), its options for the internal distribution of the available funds among 
the three main expenditure areas (personnel, operations and capital acquisition) would have been 
severely limited from the start.  However, whereas the 1996 White Paper and 1998 Defence Review 
presented a flexible ‘ways’ solution to the problem, based upon the core force / war force concept, 
the Army’s Vision 2020 had a simplistic ‘means’ answer:  increase the defence budget.  (Oddly, the 
latest defence review committee was under instruction to draft the Defence Review 2012 in the 
absence of any budgetary considerations whatsoever, potentially relegating the product to a martial 
fantasy.)284  Still, if all stakeholders in national defence had adhered to standard risk management 
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practices since the 1996 and 1998 policy’s publication, the delta between the desired outcomes of 
defence policy and the actual capabilities of the armed forces should have decreased; if not, the 
difference would be rather more substantial by this time.  Although it is neither the purpose of the 
study to express judgement on the quality of South African defence policy, nor on the excellence of 
the SANDF’s strategy, nor on the renown of the armed forces’ capabilities, a devotee of military 
strategy may easily infer such judgements from the text that follows.  Readers so inclined would do 
well to remember that the process of crafting, implementing, and managing policy and strategy 
originates from domestic culture:  a culture that not only influences the way militaries prepare for 
and conduct operations, but also determines their understanding of victory and defeat, success and 
failure, triumph and humiliation.285  What may therefore appear as a disaster to some, might equally 
well be of little consequence to another.  While promising to delve deeper into the matter of culture 
later, the study at this point needs to bring the perceived military readiness of the SANDF more 
clearly in focus.   
 
2. From Hunches to Tentative Hypotheses 
 
As suggested elsewhere, “(a) military that cannot perform well, or a system of command and control 
that does not function properly, is a waste of money and effort, no matter how neatly it may 
demonstrate civilian control, or what other theoretical virtues it may possess.”286  The previous 
chapter has argued that South African defence policy promotes a military that is both effective, 
efficient and representative of a modern system; yet, three years after the establishment of the 
SANDF, some analysts were already hinting that the armed forces’ operational standards were under 
pressure, that its morale was not what it should be and that it was haemorrhaging managerial and 
technical expertise.287  Since then, a number of articles in the press gave the impression that the 
readiness of the SANDF was increasingly in doubt.  By 2006 the SA Army’s Vision 2020 document 
went further, declaring that unit cohesion and combat readiness were being detrimentally affected 
by the increasing age and health problems of the service’s personnel, and that its budget for 
operations (already skewed by the disproportionate expenditure on human resources) was being 
absorbed by its obligatory peace support activities, leaving insufficient funds for force preparation 
exercises.  In addition, the demands of peace support operations were increasingly forcing the SA 
Army to employ reserve force elements — intended for the ‘war force’ — so as to relieve regulars in 
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the line.288  Other analysts noted that the prime mission equipment of the SA Army, which was not 
part of Strategic Defence Procurement (SDP) package announced in 1999, was facing block 
obsolescence; last but not least, the Army was being constrained by a less-than-optimal 
administrative structure, which had been developed under the guidance of private-sector 
consultants when the SANDF started with its transformation process in 1994.289 
 
While all of these reports hinted at serious capability problems within the SANDF, analysts found it 
increasingly difficult to get to either the causes or the consequences of the affair.  With the passing 
of years, the preparedness of the armed forces had gradually become — especially since the 
appointment of Ms Lindiwe Sisulu as the Minister of Defence in 2009 — ‘a matter of national 
security’, with hard data on defence being progressively restricted.290  (In the absence of any 
plausible or purported military threat to South Africa, the obvious reticence of the Department of 
Defence and Military Veterans [DOD] to present the facts for public scrutiny suggests that it may well 
be the security of government, rather than the security of the state, that is at stake here.)  This 
perceived trend towards secrecy was lately tempered, though, with the announcement of the South 
African Defence Review 2012 (Consultative Draft), which is a public document and — although its 
intimations are somewhat obscured in the section on South African Defence Spending — contains a 
host of direct references and implied allusions regarding the capabilities of the SANDF.291  In essence, 
the draft Defence Review suggests a major delta between current defence policy and the capabilities 
of the SANDF, expressed here as tentative hypotheses and in terms of the effectiveness framework 
adopted by the study: 
 
 First, the management of the DOD may be lacking integration in meeting the demands of 
defence policy.  For example, there appears to be an enduring divide between the declared 
defence mandate, government expectations, and the resource allocation to the DOD.292  
Since the SANDF does not have an approved force design, it is unable to develop a long-term 
joint armaments plan; the services therefore conduct armaments acquisition projects within 
the twin budgetary constraints of the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) and the 
DOD’s strategic capital acquisition master plan (SCAMP) instead.  Consequently, the SANDF is 
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neither able to reap the benefits of joint systems employment, nor those of strategic 
consistency in its armaments acquisition projects.293   
 Second, the SANDF may be critically deficient in the skill, motivation, and ethos that is 
required to operate a ‘modern system’, as envisaged by the 1996 White Paper, the 1998 
Defence Review and the SA Army’s Vision 2020.  The armed forces, for instance, are obliged 
to retain human resources that are no longer employable in an operational capacity, which 
exacerbates the DOD’s relentless exodus of technically skilled and professionally qualified 
personnel.294  Average standards of military proficiency are therefore continuously 
decreasing, also due in part to a dearth of funds for training, and to the limited availability of 
serviceable prime mission equipment.295 
 Third, the armed forces may no longer possess the quality of equipment that is suitable for 
execution of its present tasks, and even less for compliance with its capability obligations in 
terms of current defence policy.  Through the increase in defence commitments since 1999, 
the costly integration of the equipment acquired by means of the SDP, and the real decrease 
in the defence budget allocation, the SANDF has become derelict in conforming to its 
constitutional imperatives.  The armed forces are too poorly equipped and funded to execute 
its widening mandate, and even maintaining its present equipment levels is unsustainable.296 
 Last, an analysis of the 2012 Defence Review indicates that the SANDF has neither been able 
to tailor its activities to the limits of its own capabilities, nor to its resource constraints, nor 
to the restrictions imposed by external factors (such its commitments to the African Standby 
Force).  The Review has an interesting way of admitting the armed forces’ lack of 
responsiveness, though:  “The expanding defence personnel budget impacts negatively on 
the defence operating budget, resulting in an under-investment in the levels of maintenance 
and repair, training and preparation to meet South Africa’s defence commitments.  However, 
this apparently inflated personnel budget is not necessarily an indication of inflated staffing, 
but of an insufficient operating and capital budget to support the activities of the Defence 
Force.”297  This explanation is contested by government’s political opposition, which believes 
that the ‘capability gaps’ in the SANDF had been caused less by underfunding, and more by a 
failure to properly prioritise defence expenditure.298 
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In spite of the manifest absence of any inter-state military threat to South Africa, and in the presence 
of actual security threats both intra- and extra-state, the latest iteration of the Defence Review 
insists that the defence mandate requires the maintenance of ‘comprehensive’ defence capabilities.  
It asserts that, while a ‘full spectrum’ of capabilities would not be sustainable, or at full readiness, the 
SANDF should nevertheless maintain them in anticipation of expansion to the required levels, when 
so demanded.299  At first glance, draft Defence Review therefore appears to be a much-enhanced 
version of the 1998 policy, in the sense that attempts to cover not only the ‘primary mission’, but the 
majority of other contingencies as well.  However, what the 2012 Defence Review lacks in focus 
when compared with the 1998 version, it makes up for in Chapter 9 with its force design and force 
structure guidelines — all of which indicate the retention and improvement of conventional 
capabilities, but now with complementary functionality for the execution of joint, inter-
departmental, inter-agency and multi-national (JI2M) operations.300  In effect, the draft policy not 
only validates the 1998 Defence Review — albeit without the latter’s overt emphasis on military 
cultural change and civil-military relations — but also reinforces its predisposition towards the full 
deployment of Biddle’s ‘modern military system’.  What follows, then, is a testing of the hypotheses 
presented above, cast within the framework of integration, skill, quality, and responsiveness, and 
ultimately rendering a description of the SANDF’s perceived military capabilities.   
 
3. Degree of Integration 
 
For the SANDF to be an integrated entity, its activities would have to be internally consistent and 
mutually reinforcing, displaying a unity of purpose between force development activities, and the 
execution of the armed forces’ current and predicted functions (Brooks and Stanley, 2007).  Had the 
prescripts of approved defence policy been adhered to, the SANDF would have developed military 
capabilities that are narrowly focussed upon its primary function, which is declared to be defence 
against external aggression and the maintenance of territorial integrity.  It is accepted today that this 
conventional approach (in both its connotative and military denotative meanings) came about as a 
result of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) having had a very negative experience of the 
former SADF and its involvement in the internal security of the state, and the ANC’s fear of the 
armed forces using their influence to intervene in the political process.301  Coincidentally, it also 
allowed for policy acceptance by the two most influential communities in the military at the time, 
each comfortable with the validity of their own cultures and military styles.  For the post-1994 
government and the former revolutionary forces, a strategically restricted defence meant a truly 
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non-partisan and professional military; for the command cadre of the new SANDF, comprised mostly 
of conventionally-oriented officers from the previous regime, the accent on the primary function 
implied an opportunity to solicit funding for the continued upkeep of powerful conventional 
capabilities.302  However, there were also other factors present that obscured the potential 
misunderstanding regarding defence policy’s strategic ends.   
 
The victory over apartheid had caused a euphoric wave of idealism to sweep the country, 
accompanied by visions of an increasingly stable, peaceful, and prosperous Africa — thereby (in 
theory, at least) obviating the need for an effective, sustainable SANDF with employment utility in 
the real world.303  In the heat of the moment, the practicality of defence policy, and the suitability 
and feasibility of military strategy, appears to have become irrelevant.  This need not necessarily 
have been the case indefinitely, though, since the sanctity of the primary function should have been 
a context-determined variable and not an immutable principle.  Colin Gray (2005), 304 for one, is of 
the opinion that any thinking about future war must necessarily account for its political, social, 
cultural and — to a lesser extent — technological contexts.  Williams (2002) 305 therefore contends 
that the protection of territorial integrity and state sovereignty, in the manner prescribed by South 
African defence policymakers after 1994, is neither an accurate reflection of what modern defence 
forces (barring notable exceptions) have been doing during the 20th Century, nor of the South African 
armed forces’ actual and expected roles since their establishment in 1912; in fact, for the past 100 
years the South African military had been engaged in everything but defence against external armed 
aggression.  Cilliers (2007) 306 contributes further to the debate by stating that the SANDF’s 
conventional approach to its mandate, as reflected in its force design, may actually be indicative of a 
misinterpretation of its primary function — which deduction could be valid, considering the 
divergent cultural biases previously indicated.  In the end, though, it was in the practical 
implementation of defence policy that the contradictions between the SANDF’s force development 
objectives and its real-world functions raised to the surface.   
 
3.1 Adjusting to Operational Demands  
 
The first major shift in operational focus started with the SANDF’s increased deployment in peace 
support operations (PSO).  At the time of the White Paper’s writing, it was already apparent that 
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South Africa would eventually be obliged to develop its PSO capabilities, for a variety of good 
reasons.  These motives could have included the pressure of public opinion, considerations of 
national prestige and self-interest, the inevitable responsibilities that accompany regional-power 
status, fear of sub-continental hegemonies, and a means of keeping the armed forces gainfully 
occupied.307  The SANDF itself had at least three major reservations against large-scale employment 
in PSO:  first, the integration of the former forces into one entity had not been completed yet, and 
more time was required to meld the forces into cohesive units;308 second, an expectation that PSO 
would place an additional burden on a defence budget that was already stretched to the limit, and 
third that excessive participation in PSO may detract from preparation to execute the SANDF’s 
primary function.309  Eventually, and in spite of the SANDF’s suggestions a focus on PSO may 
negatively affect its levels of integration, quality, skill, and responsiveness, the forces of political 
necessity swept all of these considerations aside.  By 2004, the chairperson of the Defence Portfolio 
Committee observed that, at the time when South Africa was drafting its current defence policy, 
participation in multi-national peacekeeping missions was more of a statement of intent, but that 
PSO had since then become a matter of strategy.310  The SANDF of 2004 was supporting four peace 
missions, with a combined budget of close to a billion rand, and facing numerous challenges in the 
process.  These included a dearth of suitable equipment and spare parts, brought about partly by the 
long lines of sustainment.  Consequently, the Secretary for Defence “…prayed (sic) that his 
Department was undergoing a learning experience and hoped that with time things would be 
improved tremendously.”311  However, the SANDF could not expect guidance from defence policy 
publications in this regard, seeing that it is obliged to cultivate a defensive posture that presupposes 
short logistic lines, developed over time, and supporting mechanised forces that are fighting a 
regular war in defence of the state’s territorial integrity.312  While the absence of an expeditionary 
capability (referred to as an ‘intervention capability’ or, more politically correct, a ‘crisis response 
capability’)313 was to remain unresolved, PSO continued to be the major focus of SANDF operations 
to date.  By 2012, for example, the SANDF still had approximately 2 100 soldiers deployed in PSO, in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and the Central African Republic.314  What defence 
                                               
307
  Cilliers, J. and Malan, M. 1996.  A Regional Peacekeeping Role for South Africa:  Pressures, 
Problems and Prognosis.  In:  African Security Review, Vol 5, No 3.  
308
  Malan, M.1996.  Foundations for Regional Security:  Preparing to Keep the Peace in Southern 
Africa.  In:  African Security Review, Vol 5 No 1, p 6. 
309
  Cilliers, J. and Malan, M. op cit.  Between 1989 and 1996 the SANDF had seen its budget sliced 
by about 50% in real terms.  
310
  DOD Briefing to parliament on SANDF Peacekeeping Operations, dated 24 August 2004 
(available at http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20040823-sandf-peacekeeping-operations-
department-briefing) 
311
  Ibid. 
312
  Le Roux, L. op cit p 277. 
313
  Defence Review 2012 op cit p 419. 
314
  Article by defenceWeb 03 May 2012 (available at 
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25317)  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Assessing Defence Policy Outcomes 
- 64 - 
policy publications considers as a secondary task had by then turned into a long-term commitment, 
as predicted by numerous defence analysts in 1995 already.315 
 
The second overt inconsistency with defence policy arose when government did an about-turn on its 
previous decision to award the border control function to the police service.316  In his address of 14 
February 2003, President Thabo Mbeki announced the discontinuation of the SANDF’s commando 
system, along with their rural policing- and border control functions.317  While the latter role was to 
be turned over to the South African Police Service (SAPS), the full-time force of the SANDF continued 
with their border control function, albeit to an ever-diminishing extent:  from an average of 2 016 
soldiers in 2004, the numbers dropped to 504 in 2008.318  However, with South Africa patently losing 
control of its borders — and with rhino poaching in the Kruger National Park drawing the attention of 
the international community — government reversed its previous decision in 2009, promising that 
the SANDF would resume the border safeguarding function by April 2010.319  By March 2011, border 
security had therefore replaced PSO as the first national defence priority.320  During the same 
announcement, the SANDF freely admitted that the decision to cede its border control function to 
other agencies had been a serious error, and that the SAPS’ hasty abandonment of the international 
border implied that large areas were without any policing whatsoever.  Consequently, the Chair of 
the 2012 Defence Review Committee confirmed that sea- and land border protection, along with PSO 
on the African continent, had become the SANDF’s principal tasks.  To this, he added that the PSO 
force levels provided for in the 1998 Defence Review had been an underestimation, and that defence 
policy had not foreseen many other developments, such as piracy on the African coast.321  From 
these statements, one can infer a measure of internal consistency and mutually reinforcing processes 
in current military operations, which should be enhancing the integration and effectiveness of the 
armed forces in action.  However, this is an illusion:  approved defence policy publications still list the 
functions of PSO and border control as ‘secondary’, implying that the delta between declared policy 
and military capabilities — and therefore the lack of integration, between the tactical- and strategic 
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levels of defence management — is actually expanded and increased by the SANDF’s pragmatic 
adaptations to its security context.  None of this ambiguity is visible in the third digression from 
defence policy prescripts, though. 
 
3.2 Accommodating Political Priorities  
 
Possibly the most insidious distraction from preparing the SANDF to execute its primary function has 
been a gradual de facto migration of departmental priorities, away from the development of purely 
military capabilities, towards supporting government’s human security agenda.  The DOD’s plan of 
2002, for example, contains three military strategic objectives (defence against external aggression; 
promoting security through discretionary military deployments; supporting the people of South 
Africa through the use of collateral utility), and no ministerial priorities.322  In the next year, the 
strategic objectives remained essentially the same — but for the removal of internal operations from 
the security programme — while the policy writers added three ministerial priorities:  the monitoring 
of the new force structure and design; the implementation of a new human resource strategy; and 
the promotion of regional, collective security.323  As time passed, the scope of ministerial priorities 
gradually grew to include the restoration of the SANDF’s conventional defence capabilities (2004); 
meeting the demands and risks of PSO (2005); a new defence review, and concerns with governance 
and accountability (2006); the transformation of the defence industry (2007); facilities maintenance 
and the revitalisation of the reserves (2008); and the formulation of a defence strategy that is 
responsive to socio-economic and environmental issues (2009).  During these years, the ministerial 
priorities remained focussed on a combination of measures to enhance military effectiveness (either 
potentially, in executing defence’s primary function, or in practice while conducting PSO) and, 
especially in the latter half of the period, on improving organisational efficiency.   
 
This trend changed in 2010, when practical expression was given to defence policy’s 
acknowledgement that “(t)he greatest threats to the security of the South African people are 
socioeconomic problems like poverty and unemployment, and the high level of crime and 
violence.”324  For the first time, the new minister of defence — who had accepted the position in 
2009 — explicitly prioritised a number of welfare issues that either had little bearing upon the 
SANDF’s effectiveness, or could actually detract from its cost-effectiveness.  These included the 
establishment of a functional Department of Military Veterans, the establishment of a National 
Defence Force Service Commission (for the purpose of attending to the SANDF’s remuneration and 
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conditions of service), and the optimal utilisation of the collateral value of defence capabilities in 
responding to the country’s socio-economic needs.  For its resolute focus on domestic politics, its 
integration-defeating potential, and its utter irrelevance in the enhancement of military 
effectiveness, the last ministerial priority is worth quoting in full: 325 
 
“Provide a lead in the development and implementation of the Community Service 
Programme (CSP).  In an effort to curb migration to urban areas, escalating levels of service 
delivery protest actions, high level of unemployment that is prevalent amongst women, 
youth, military veterans and people in the rural areas, a community services programme will 
be initiated that will re-skill the citizens, thus providing another opportunity for economic 
participation through maintenance of existing infrastructure and heritage sites.  As such 
artisan and cultural promotion programmes will be promoted within the rural training and 
this will form the core of the National Community Service Concept that the Defence Force 
will be infused in all communities that are intricately connected to Defence institutions (sic).” 
 
Finally, the SANDF’s annual performance plan for 2012 presents seven departmental priorities, of 
which two (enhancement of the SANDF’s landward defence capability; revitalisation of the reserves) 
are long-standing, relevant to the primary function, and at least partially funded.  Two others 
(improving maritime security; enhancing SANDF forward deployment / PSO capabilities) associates 
with secondary missions, but are unfunded, while two more (implementation of the National Youth 
Service; job creation) cannot be directly related to military capabilities at all.326  Even if one ignores 
the incongruity of these guidelines with approved defence policy, the possibility of combining the 
divergent ministerial priorities into a functional, coherent force development strategy seems to be 
remote indeed.  For the lack of a national security strategy, the enduring contradiction between the 
demands of defence policy and the focus of military operations, and the DOD’s more recent 
embracing of socio-economic functions, one must ultimately judge the SANDF to be deficient in 
strategic integrity.  With that hypothesis validated, the following section will deal with the armed 
forces’ military professional development.  
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4. Level of Skill 
 
In following the discussion below, the reader has to be conscious of the causal relationship between 
organisational culture, skills development, and effectiveness in action.  Snider (1999) 327 is of the 
opinion that the qualities of discipline, professional ethos, cohesion, esprit de corps, and morale are 
all derivatives of a military culture.  While these qualities on their own are important determinants of 
skill, as attested to in the previous chapter, the collective of military culture may also be the single 
most significant factor in the generation of military effectiveness — which pertains directly to the 
research problem of the study — and the processes involved in military innovation — which has a 
bearing on the armed forces’ responsiveness, in particular.328  Moving from theory to application, 
South African defence policy publications are unequivocal about the fact that the preparation of 
personnel to execute the SANDF's primary function (defence against external military aggression) is 
the essence of its training ethos.329  Consequently, the SANDF’s participation in (and training for) PSO 
was its first major deviation from both its professed training ethos and defence policy’s strategic 
focus on the ‘primary function’.  Malan (1996) 330 is of the opinion that, since skilling for PSO 
emphases communication and mediation, an appreciation for cultural diversity, and respect for 
international humanitarian law, it would assist in breaking down the attitudinal barriers among 
members of the former forces that comprised the newly–constituted SANDF.  He continues by 
extolling the virtues of force preparation for PSO, noting its potential for the inculcation of universal 
military values, the enhancement of basic military skills and professionalism, and the improvement of 
the armed forces’ legitimacy in public- and politicians’ eyes alike.331  In theory, a focus on PSO 
therefore has the potential to enhance the SANDF’s mission-specific competency, the 
appropriateness of its military ethos, and ultimately its job proficiency — all of which Brooks and 
Stanley (2007)332 consider to be desirable attributes, and which are aligned with South African 
defence policy’s demand for the inculcation of respect for human rights, international law, and civil 
supremacy over the armed forces.  However — and here lies the policy conundrum — to get there, 
the SANDF would have had to abandon, or modify, a number of beliefs and attitudes generally 
considered essential for proper combat training:  an aggressive warrior ethos, the will to win at all 
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costs, chauvinist anti-foreigner attitudes, and prejudice against an enemy.333  It is therefore a matter 
of supreme irony that the logic of defence policy requires a military predisposed to the aggressive 
annihilation of an invading enemy force, while an improvement in the SANDF’s PSO capability ― the 
grammar according to which it actually has been conducting operations since its establishment ― 
requires the opposite:  the exercising of patience, perseverance, restraint, compassion, and 
kindness.334  The SANDF therefore confronts the dilemma of simultaneously enhancing its warfighting 
effectiveness, in anticipation of combat operations that are highly implausible, while developing the 
disparate character required for the conduct of current military operations.  Defence’s reaction to 
these opposing imperatives clearly connotes with its responsiveness, which the study deals with 
later; for now, one may conclude that the SANDF’s professional ethos ― and possibly its military 
culture ― may be indeterminate, if not schizophrenic or downright dysfunctional.   
 
Turning to the training regimen of the SANDF, one soon discovers that detailed (unclassified) 
information regarding the quality and intensity of the SANDF’s training is hard to come by, and that 
those sanitised snippets that the DOD releases for publication are insufficient to base an opinion on.  
The Secretary for Defence announced, for example, that the SANDF in 2009 successfully executed a 
total of nine joint, interdepartmental, and multinational exercises, one of which was in preparation 
for the provision of security for the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup.  To assess the capability and 
readiness of the Southern Africa Standby Brigade, the SANDF also conducted an exercise involving 
almost all of the SADC region’s armed forces.335  In stark contrast to these innocuous 
pronouncements, though, some defence analysts are of the opinion that the SANDF is confronting a 
skills crisis, for at least two reasons.  The first is budget-related, where the correspondent reports (for 
example) that the flying hours available for training the SA Air Force are so limited that it cannot put 
its newly-acquired fighter force into operation.  The SA Navy is similarly restricted in its operational- 
and training hours at sea, while a deficient budget constrains the SA Army to one brigade-level 
exercise (with reduced force allocation) per annum.336  However, the 2012 Defence Review 
Committee’s assessment is probably the most valid indicator in this regard:  it points to a chronic 
under-investment in training and force preparation, coupled with the poor serviceability of major 
prime mission equipment, as being the primary reasons for the SANDF’s declining standards of 
proficiency.337  This may very well be true, but does not provide the complete picture.  Since skill also 
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speaks to the armed forces’ motivation, morale, and military ethos, one has to face a second reason 
for the SANDF’s alleged skills crisis:  its human resource practises.   
 
Heitman (2010) 338 avers that the Defence Secretariat has not been effective since its establishment 
in 1995, reason being that political imperatives had resulted in the appointment of senior civil 
servants in key posts without them having any defence- or civil service experience worth mentioning.  
Furthermore, “(t)he SANDF continues to suffer from self-destructive personnel management focused 
on gender and racial quotas to the near exclusion of practical requirements.  It is unable or unwilling 
to dispense with dishonest and incompetent officers, which have driven out experienced white 
officers and demoralises black officers, who are frustrated and compromised by the 
incompetents.”339  As a matter of fact, the SANDF’ motivation and morale has been a matter of public 
debate since the infamous soldiers’ march to the seat of government on 26 August 2009.340  In the 
months thereafter, an Interim National Defence Force Service Commission (INDFSC) was appointed 
to investigate a host of issues pertaining, among others, to the disempowerment of commanders; 
the defence budget allocation and composition; the state of defence infrastructure; the provision of 
health care and transport to military personnel; career management within the Defence Force; the 
grievance mechanism; command, control and communication in the SANDF; remuneration and 
conditions of service; and the overall wellness of the Department of Defence.341  Although the 
minister never made the full report public, the informed populace learnt enough to warrant 
considerable disquiet.  This section therefore concludes with a similar verdict as the previous:  the 
SANDF’s training and motivation does not match international benchmarks for military 
professionalism.  Again, the discrepancy between the spirit of defence policy and the outcomes of 
military practice appears to be uncomfortably large, not only because the SANDF seems to be unable 
to meet its ‘primary function’ skills obligations, but also because it appears to be faltering in the 
basics — those emotive factors encompassed by its military culture ― that are required for 
effectiveness in military missions involving combat.  On that note, the study turns to a description of 
the SANDF’s relationship with technology and modernisation. 
 
5. Extent of Quality 
 
With the 1998 Defence Review supplying the motive, the South African government and the DOD 
embarked upon the SDP and proceeded with the acquisition of four frigates (euphemistically 
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denoted ’corvettes’ at the time), three submarines, 30 light utility helicopters, 24 lead-in fighter 
trainers, and 28 light fighter aircraft. 342  Much controversy has dogged the SDP since then.  Apart 
from the political, economic, and even legal concerns, security analysts also argued that the SDP 
acknowledged neither the sensible needs for national defence, nor the trends that were already 
visible in the DOD’s budget allocation and expenditure priorities.  With regard to the former, military 
pundits argued the SA Army has always been the lead service for deployments in Africa, while the 
SDP only catered for the Air Force and the Navy; with reference to the latter, the SDP committed the 
capital acquisition budget for more than a decade into the future, while the operating budget for 
force development, force preparation and force employment was patently under pressure.343  
Whereas it is therefore debatable whether the acquired weaponry is superior in terms of their 
designed functionality, their optimisation for employment in the African context is even more 
questionable.  Ironically, the acceptance of the SDP burden — meant to signify a qualitative leap 
forward, as required by defence policy ― has indirectly resulted in the deterioration of the wider 
SANDF’s level of skill and its general standards of preparedness. 344  Open literature provides a 
number of examples of the SANDF’s decreasing quality.   
 
With reference to the SA Air Force, the gradual loss of relevant capabilities has received some 
publicity over time.  These reports range from the Air Force considering the Denel AH-2 Rooivalk 
attack helicopter for premature storage,345 to the obsolescence of radar systems,346 the A400M 
Airbus debacle,347 and on towards the much-publicised wrangling regarding presidential air 
transport.348  The Defence Review 2012, too, admits to the SA Air Force being unable to maintain 
combat readiness “… across the full spectrum of operational tasks expected of it.”349  Whereas the 
much-debated SDP had presented the SA Air Force with new light fighters, jet trainers and light utility 
helicopters, the medium- and light fixed wing are now reaching the end of their operational life.  
External operations can no longer be supported, while the intensive maintenance cycles that the 
aged transport aircraft are obliged to undergo have reduced their operational availability even 
further.350  In the absence of any airborne early warning capability, compliance with the policy 
demand of intelligence-driven operations to secure South Africa’s airspace and territorial integrity is 
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virtually impossible.351  The Chief of the Air Force raised other obsolescence issues at the annual Air 
Force Day parade on 27 January 2012, when he indicated challenges in the areas of maritime 
surveillance, VVIP transportation, night-fighting capabilities, electronic warfare platforms, and UAV 
sensors.352  While the SA Air force is apparently sliding down the capability scale in terms of meeting 
defence policy’s air power technology demands, the decay appears to be more rapid in the types of 
air support required for a ‘war among the people’:  those services rendered by transport aircraft and 
helicopters.   
 
The apparent decline in the SANDF’s ability to procure, maintain, and employ technologically 
advanced equipment extends to the SA Navy as well.  Although mere numbers do not tell the full 
story, it is worth noting that the SA Navy had 23 warships (frigates, destroyers, and submarines) in 
1961, but only 11 in 2011.353  As with the other services, the SA Navy is experiencing relentless 
pressure on its operating budget.  In spite of having been a beneficiary of the SDP and its modern 
equipment, the Navy has recently had to increase its operational tempo dramatically in order to deal 
with the piracy threat off the African East Coast;354 consequently, it has had to spend funds dedicated 
for fleet maintenance and refit elsewhere.  No longer is the Navy able to make its new vessels 
combat-ready for the types of missions envisaged by defence policy.  Coming to the mundane (but 
much more plausible) necessity of ensuring territorial integrity and protecting resources in South 
Africa’s Exclusive Economic Zone, the Navy is even worse off.  It has had to maintain the obsolete 
Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) in service for longer than anticipated, and the Navy is only lately 
considering their replacement; furthermore, the complete absence of static- and airborne maritime 
sensors implies that the Navy has no domain awareness around South Africa’s coasts, and 
intelligence-driven operations are near impossible.355  As with the SA Air Force, the Navy seems 
neither in conformance with the theoretical demands of defence policy, nor with the practical 
demands of national security.  Deane-Peter Baker (2012), 356 for example, is of the opinion that the 
SA Navy faces a capability/challenge mismatch.  What decision-makers conceived and equipped it as 
a ‘counter-navy’ force, and provided with frigates and submarines to deal with equivalent maritime 
combatants, now confronts a host of immediate operational challenges (piracy, smuggling, poaching, 
and other criminal activities):  challenges that it cannot resolve while burdened with an inappropriate 
operational philosophy, doctrine, organisational structure, and equipment.  In any case, policy does 
not consider law enforcement of marine resources and the maritime zone as a primary defence 
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task.357  While efforts are nonetheless underway to revive the Navy’s offshore- and inshore patrol 
capabilities, there are early indications that budgetary constraints may — again — sink these 
initiatives.358  In the light of these facts, the SA Navy appears unable to meet either the naval-
strategic demands of defence policy (for a lack of operational funding) or the maritime-strategic 
requirements of current operational utility (for a lack policy direction and appropriate equipment to 
do the job with). 
 
This may also be true for the SA Army, since it is facing the block obsolescence of its prime mission 
equipment, and of the majority of its support capabilities.  While the Army has not benefited from 
the SDP or any other major capital investment programme, it has since 2009 had to reallocate 
significant chunks of its operating budget to personnel expenditure.  Consequently, it has had to 
defer major maintenance- and repair programmes into the future:359  bringing into balance the 
project scope elements of performance, cost and time on the one hand, but resulting in a steady loss 
of serviceable equipment on the other — this, in spite of the fact that the armed forces deployed 
about 6 470 combat vehicles in the late 1990s (the vast majority from the SA Army), and only about 1 
680 by 2011.360  By 2012, the SA Army therefore had an immediate need for modern equipment to 
conduct border safeguarding operations with:  suitable patrol vehicles, a suite of surveillance 
equipment and sensors, and a designated communications system.  It also required appropriate 
equipment and weapons for parachute forces, such as protected and air-transportable vehicles.  Not 
quite so pressing was the urgent requirement for infantry combat vehicles, armoured personnel 
carriers, logistic vehicles, and light artillery.  Finally, the Army faced terminal obsolescence of some 
field support systems, such as water purification, kitchens, accommodation, technical workshops, 
and hospitals — systems required for operating on external logistic lines.361  Inevitably, one is left to 
conclude that the SANDF is currently neither capable of sustaining its existing ordnance, nor of 
conducting major combat operations (as required by defence policy in execution of its ‘primary 
function’), nor of competent participation in new-generation operations.362  The SANDF simply does 
not have the ability to acquire equipment and weaponry that are not only superior in terms of 
designed functionality, but also optimised for the context within which the armed forces expect to 
employ them — neither as anticipated by the theory of defence policy, nor as demanded in practice 
by the government of the day.  With this section concluded, the study now ventures on to describe 
the SANDF’s multi-faceted version of a military evolution, as it grew from the defence force’s 
incremental (and not necessarily voluntary or cognizant) adaptations to its operating environment.   
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6. Measure of Responsiveness 
 
As recorded in the previous chapter, South African defence policy writers were abundantly aware of 
the fact that the SANDF had to tailor its activities to the limits of its capabilities and resource 
constraints; in fact, they also provided potential responses to these challenges.  Their knowledge was 
based upon practical experience, since the defence budget had decreased in real terms by more than 
49% from 1989 until 1997 (reducing by 11,1% in nominal terms between 1995 and 1998 alone —see 
Addendum B363), while at the same time the integration of constituent forces into the new SANDF, 
the bulk of which was into the SA Army, resulted in an almost 35 per cent increase in its personnel 
numbers.364  While spending on military equipment declined from 44% of defence expenditure in the 
1980s (at the height of South Africa’s conflict on the Namibia-Angola border) to about 28% by 1994 
(when the liberation forces won their political victory), the total cost of personnel already accounted 
for about half of the budget by the mid-1990s.365  By March 2011 the Interim National Defence Force 
Service Commission reported that defence policy proposes a ratio of 40:30:30 for the cost of 
personnel, operations, and capital expenditure, but that the 2010/11 budget reflected a skewed ratio 
of 44:43:13 instead.  While the defence budget represented 1,1% of GDP at the time (only 3,9% of 
total Government expenditure, generally thought to be a good thing), it was also inadequate to meet 
the needs of the DOD.  The deficit prompted a request for an additional amount of R2,6 billion for 
the 2010/11 fiscal year; instead, the final allocation was reduced by R2 billion.366  The 2012 Defence 
Review is therefore of the opinion that, since the 1998 force design was neither affordable nor 
sustainable (read not feasible), the current mismatch between defence policy intent and policy 
execution (read an imbalance between policy ends on one hand, and policy ways and means on the 
other) had already arisen at the time that the policy was written.367  A cursory glance at the SA 
Army’s post-transformation response to the proven resource deficiencies sheds further light on the 
matter.   
 
By the year 2006, at the time of Vision 2020’s publication, the SA Army was already beset by 
numerous problems that had characteristics of an emergent strategy; a strategy that was developing 
inadvertently, through a process of learning and conditioning, without the conscious intent of the 
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Army’s senior management, and therefore an involuntary response.368  While some of the challenges 
were possibly self-inflicted (such as a dysfunctional organizational structure), the most intractable 
and pervasive obstacles to the achievement of Vision 2020’s ideals were deemed to be the result of a 
woefully inadequate budget.369  By default, the Army has allowed the creation of an imbalance in its 
fixed- and variable cost relationships, resulting in (among others) a severe reduction in capital 
expenditure, technology development, and the budgets for training exercises and operations.370  
These distorted expenditure ratios are apparently necessitated by socio-political imperatives (such as 
the SANDF’s role in job creation), which prevents the SA Army from legally and equitably terminating 
the service of soldiers that are, for a variety of reasons, redundant or no longer deemed effective in 
terms of Vision 2020’s demands. 371  Consequently, it is questionable whether the Army is either able 
to conduct major combat operations — as per the demands of defence policy publications — or to 
deploy adequate forces in border protection (the latter being is a realistic way of ensuring territorial 
integrity, which is one of defence’s few constitutional imperatives).372  As in the case of the other 
services, this study would therefore argue that the SA Army had failed to apply a suitable and 
feasible (if not politically acceptable) risk management strategy, and that its responses to its well-
known resource challenges had been sadly lacking in their focus on maintaining military 
effectiveness.  Given the dire implications of such a broad statement, theoreticians and practitioners 
alike are sure to challenge its veracity.  The issue of responsiveness therefore seems to require 
additional elucidation, as per the precedent set in the previous chapter.  Accordingly, this study is 
also concerned with the armed forces’ responsiveness in terms of soft issues such as its conservation 
or adaptation of successful military practices, its bias towards successful precedents, the SANDF’s 
position regarding religious- and ideological constraints, and its willingness to accept innovative ideas 
(Parker, 2005) — all of which may be related to the defence force’s organisational culture. 
 
7. Responsiveness as a Matter of Culture 
 
The study has already indicated that defence policy did not deliberately attempt to conserve a 
designated set military practises and martial traditions.  At the same time, it has been argued that 
the physical, administrative, and doctrinal infrastructure of the former SADF, along with the 
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operational practices associated with it, served as the de facto framework for the construction of the 
South African military after 1994, to the extent that some of smaller forces complained of being 
‘absorbed’ into the apartheid machinery, rather than being ‘integrated’.373  Resistance was to be 
expected, since “(w)hen we operate as culture carriers and are conscious of our cultural 
membership, we are emotionally attached to our culturally learned categories of thought; we value 
them and protect them as an aspect of group identity.”374  The illusory conservation of the SADF’s 
military practices, associated with its western, modern-system oriented military culture, was due to 
have a short life in practice, though, and for more reasons than the fact that their adoption may have 
been — at least on the part of the former revolutionary forces — the result of provisional 
expediency, rather than of genuine conviction. 
 
The study draws theoretical support for this statement from Murray (1999),375 who is in agreement 
with Parker when he posits that military culture usually changes slowly over time:  as a response to 
advances in technology, to the impact of leadership and —of critical importance — to change in the 
larger socio-political culture of the nation.  Regarding top defence leadership’s composition, suffice 
to say that the SANDF has changed radically from being largely a white, former SADF-dominated 
organisation in 1994, to an organization mainly under the command of black officers from MK in 
2012.376  Whereas the study had previously confirmed the conventional orientation of the former 
SADF officers who had influenced the making defence policy the most, these orientations have since 
been superseded by the basic assumptions of leaders from the irregular forces, of whom it was said 
that, “(u)nlike government armies they lack, once deployed, the benefit of reliable resources, a fixed 
infrastructure, a capable administrative system and an institutionalised military-historical 
tradition.”377  During the same period, the demographic (and therefore cultural) composition of the 
country’s ruling elite changed likewise, to reflect the whole of South African society and to express 
the state’s dominant value sets accordingly.  At the heart of the SANDF’s limited responsiveness, 
therefore, lies the paralyzing dichotomy between an antediluvian cultural paradigm, as exemplified 
by current defence policy publications, and an authentic military culture that had evolved, partly by 
design and partly by default, since the inauguration of the new dispensation in 1994.  Snider’s 
submission “… that those who tinker with the culture and climate of military organizations may well 
be, either unknowingly or without concern, modifying the long-term effectiveness of (the country’s) 
                                               
373
  Williams, R. 2004.  The Impact of “Umkhonto We Sizwe” on the Creation of the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF). In:  Journal of Security Sector Management, Vol 2 No 1 – 
March 2004, p 16.  
374
  Schein, E.H. 1995 op cit p 28. 
375
  Murray op cit pp 135 – 138. 
376
  With the belated retirement of Lt Gen Gagiano at the end of September 2012 – he had remained 
in office for an extended period, on invitation of the Minister — the last of the former SADF 
service chiefs had hung up their caps.  The chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Military Health 
Services, Defence Intelligence and the SANDF now all came to be from Umkhonto we Sizwe.   
377
  Williams, R. op cit p 2.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Assessing Defence Policy Outcomes 
- 76 - 
armed forces”378 may equally apply to the SANDF, thereby providing not only an explanation for the 
study’s overarching assessment of the armed forces’ perceived effectiveness, but also for the size 
and shape of the observed delta between defence policy and military capability.  Without being 
overly reductionist, it is possible that the present condition and character of the SANDF simply 
reflects the unintended consequences of a conflicted, peacetime military cultural evolution — which 
statement now brings the discussion to its interim conclusions. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Capable militaries still have important functions to fulfil within the societies they serve, even though 
their utility lately seems to reside in the deployment of armed forces, rather than in the employment 
of armed force.  For the SANDF to have evolved into an effective organisation, the translation of 
South Africa’s defence policy into a sound military strategy, scientifically and artistically balanced 
among its ends, ways, and means, would have been of crucial importance; failing which, all manner 
of risks would have accrued to the enterprise objectives.  However, people from different 
backgrounds do not interpret policy, or make strategy, in the same way.  As indicated by any number 
of theoreticians and practitioners, the culture of societies in general, and of the armed forces in 
particular, has a major influence not only in the way that stakeholders subjectively perceive military 
effectiveness, but also in how they think one should bring it about.  In the case of South Africa, the 
draft 2012 Defence Review avers that the SANDF may conceivably suffer from less-than-adequate 
degrees of integration, skill, quality, and responsiveness.  The chapter above has dealt with these 
tentative hypotheses in turn, coming firstly to the conclusion that the SANDF is presently lacking in 
strategic integration, and — if the latest ministerial priorities and budget speeches are anything to go 
by — may be in danger of losing its strategic focus altogether.  Furthermore, there is valid cause for 
doubting the SANDF’s skill levels as well, for reasons that have as much to do with deficiencies in the 
armed forces’ motivation, morale, and military ethos, as it pertains to the delta between defence 
policy and military practice.  On the subject of equipment quality, abundant evidence of the SANDF’s 
inability to sustain its current inventory, even in the absence of the demands of by defence policy or 
current operations, is available in the public domain.  Last, the discussion on responsiveness leads to 
the conclusion that a limited means allocation, insufficient to meet the SANDF’s concurrent 
obligations in terms of declared defence policy, international peace support initiatives, and the 
emerging threats to national security, petrifies the defence force.  The absence of a suitable response 
to these challenges — epitomised by the excessive longevity of South African defence policy — 
relates as much to a schizophrenic national- and military culture as it indicts defence leadership of 
the past decade.   
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Conclusion 
 
1. Background 
 
No government should simply assume effective defence policy implementation (and neither should a 
peacetime military presume a working force development strategy) from the mere absence of 
operational feedback.  In solving the research problem — through a descriptive analysis of the 
variance between South African defence policy and the actual military capability of the SANDF — the 
study has not only confirmed the veracity of this statement, but also managed to produce tentative 
explanations for some of the observed phenomena.  While the thesis therefore mainly sought to 
provide a general description of the delta between the objectives of defence policy on one hand, and 
the actual outcomes of the military’s force development programmes on the other, such a study 
would have been meaningless without a portrayal of the context within which it is situated.  The 
researcher was therefore obliged to conduct a general interrogation of global- and South African 
security perspectives since the end of the Cold War first, focussing in particular on developments 
after the advent of the new dispensation in 1994.  Although it has not been possible to provide even 
a brief description of some of the major sources of defence policy and military effectiveness (such as 
societal culture, and the state’s political- and economic institutions), the study includes at least a 
relevant selection of thoughts on the philosophies of war, and the potential influence of 
international political archetypes on defence policy development. 
 
All societies have enduring and pervasive convictions regarding these matters, which they express in 
(among others) the policies that produce.  South African defence policy, too, reflects the mind-set of 
its authors, which the researcher may deduce through an analysis of the text.  Closer scrutiny of the 
relevant policy publications consequently revealed strong indications of an attachment to a 
cataclysmic philosophy of war, in statements that deny any aggressive intentions towards any other 
state; that deliberately avoid any impression of relative military superiority; that profess to a purely 
defensive strategy (albeit retaining the capability to go on the offensive at the operational level of 
warfare), and that declare a willingness to engage in combat only as a measure of absolutely last 
resort.  A society, government, or military in this mode is unlikely to spend much energy and 
resources on developing an effective defence force anyway, unless it becomes important for national 
survival.  Furthermore, the policy publications’ emphasis on the prevention of conflict, 
5
4
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Conclusion 
- 78 - 
multilateralism, and collective defence places it firmly in the liberal/idealist tradition of international 
politics, again making the employment of other instruments of state (diplomacy or the economy, for 
example) much more likely than that of the military.  Further conclusions from the study, especially 
insofar as they arise from an analysis of defence policy publications, support these initial 
expectations of the military’s relative unimportance in South African affairs of state.  However, there 
is also evidence of the same defence policy being increasingly at odds not only with universal 
developments in the field of security studies, but also with the realities of the security environment 
to which it supposed to be applied.   
 
2. From Military Threats to Domestic Vulnerabilities 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, there is ample testimony to the fact that both academics and 
practitioners have extended the concept of security from its former preoccupation with foreign 
military threats, to include the security of individuals and societies within — or even among — 
national states.  In South Africa, for example, the 1998 Defence Review tacitly acknowledges the 
salience of domestic vulnerabilities and the non-military dimensions of security, noting that the 
greatest threats to the wellbeing of the South African people are socioeconomic problems and public 
disorder.  A reader taking this statement at face value may therefore argue that government has 
chosen the individual citizen as the referent object for security (implied by the redefinition of the 
primary threats to the nation) and believes South Africa to be a strong power / weak state (i.e. a 
well-organized country with a comparatively strong economy and defence force, but rather weak in 
its social cohesion).  Had this perception been true for the writers of defence policy as well, their 
products would have reflected the fact that states in this condition are increasingly vulnerable to 
domestic political threats, but are quite secure from foreign military hazards.  Instead, the 1998 
Defence Review posits that government has adopted a narrow, conventional approach to defence, 
and that the primary function of the SANDF is protection against external aggression — a policy 
position better suited for states in a weak power / strong state condition.  The apparent incongruity 
of this policy response gives the impression that South African defence policymakers were either 
oblivious to the fact that (1) a global revolution in strategic affairs had already occurred, and that (2) a 
national revolution in security affairs was currently underway; or (and this is more plausible) that 
other political, social and institutional factors contributed to the defence policy position in larger 
measure than military logic did.  However, the study had to investigate the South African context in 
greater depth to arrive at valid conclusions in this regard.   
 
A revolution in strategic affairs speaks directly to the changed utility of military force.  Given the 
history of apartheid South Africa, policymakers in the first decade after 1994 were obviously 
cognizant of the vastly reduced usefulness of threatening, or employing, military force in combat 
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operations.  This inhibition regarding the employment of sanctioned, organised, purposeful violence 
by the state is abundantly visible in the South African defence policy position, and the SANDF’s 
mandate.  However, due to their unintended longevity, the policy publications’ directives were soon 
overtaken by a global paradigm shift in the utility of military forces — forces that other countries now 
routinely use on foreign soil for the amelioration, containment, deterrence and even coercion of 
violent conflict.  In contrast, South Africa’s defence policy left its armed forces without the motives to 
develop, deploy, and employ expeditionary forces in (for example) peace support operations, 
thereby denying government a foreign policy tool that it could have used in the active enhancement 
of peace and security on the African continent — an attitude consistent with the ‘mental model’ of 
South African decision-makers, as argued above.  However, while this approach appeared to be 
mildly incongruent with the South African government’s liberal/idealist orientation in international 
politics from the start, it was only in later years that the dissonance between the national strategic 
context, the declared defence policy, and actual policy implementation became abundantly visible.  
The inconsistencies between the demands of the state security, defence policy and the SANDF’s 
capabilities become even more apparent if one is prepared to contemplate the notion of a 
‘revolution in security affairs’ in a South African context.   
 
This theory points to a clear discontinuity in the general relevance of military power, and is based on 
the premise that defence and security are not synonymous (a fact implicitly recognized in the 1996 
and 1998 defence policy publications, but yet to be unequivocally stated in a national security 
strategy).  The study has argued that makers of South African defence policy understood the link 
between human- and state security, as well as the necessity to rebuild a South African society that 
the preceding regime had divided and selectively disadvantaged.  In contrast to these realities, 
policy’s singular focus on defence against external aggression could most plausibly have arisen from a 
strong state / weak power paradigm only — a belief according to which South African society would 
be a cohesive entity, but the state would have little influence in the region.  The policy ramifications 
of such a point of departure would be to trivialise those military tasks (for example border control, 
support to the police, and security of national key points) with which the SANDF could still have 
assisted in enhancing national security, and incidentally also have ensured compliance with the 
armed forces’ constitutional mandate.  Further proof of this policy paradigm came when, within a 
decade of defence policy’s publication, government had largely removed the armed forces from the 
domestic security domain as well. 
 
The study has also argued that, while parliament is lately revising the political decisions that resulted 
in the apparent isolation and torpor of the SANDF, the military has already suffered the 
consequences of public apathy by now:  a stagnant budget, a reduced professional status of the 
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military, and a lack of public debate on defence matters.  Adherence to policy has prevented the 
SANDF from effectively maintaining, adjusting, or augmenting those military capabilities that the 
apartheid regime had previously nurtured to ensure its domestic security with (the doctrine, skills, 
and equipment required for border control, support to the police, and internal stabilisation 
operations, for example).  By interpreting the constitutional imperative to mean that the SANDF was 
obliged “to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people” against an 
external, military threat, defence policy appears to have biased the armed forces towards a strategy 
that is not only highly implausible within a regional context, but also largely irrelevant within the 
domestic.  When viewed against its external backdrop — from whence the strategic problems arise 
that it is supposed to address — policy that may have been merely dubious in 1998 appears to have 
become hugely imprudent by 2012.  Nevertheless, defence policy also has an internal, structural 
focus, usually premised not only upon the maximisation of specific operational effectiveness within 
policy’s assumed strategic context, but also upon military effectiveness in general.  The next section 
will therefore conclude on the actual results of South African defence policy’s implementation, based 
upon a comparison between the demands of defence policy on the one hand, and the SANDF’s 
capabilities on the other.  
 
3. Developing the Attributes of Military Effectiveness 
 
In terms of the SANDF’s force design, defence policy demands a balanced, modern, affordable, and 
technologically advanced organization, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently.  Read 
in association with policy’s definition of its primary role, this statement biases SANDF towards the 
development of a ‘modern military system’ (Biddle) that carries out the ‘western way of war’ 
(Parker).  The study has confirmed that this particular archetype was acceptable to competing groups 
of South African decision-makers at the time when defence policy was being compiled, albeit for 
different reasons:  one retrospective, based upon aversion and apathy towards a military regime of 
the past, and the other futurist, based upon an affinity and ambition towards the deployment of a 
modern military system.  Government (in which the former liberation movements now held sway) 
wished to see a demilitarised society, in which the armed forces were stripped from even indirect 
political influence, and exclusively focussed on a hypothetical enemy from abroad; the aficionados of 
traditional military power — mostly officers from the former SADF — believed that this very same 
option would allow the SANDF to retain its conventional arsenal, doctrine, war-fighting capabilities, 
and ultimately its status as a regional military power. 
 
Given South Africa’s moderate security milieu of the late 20th Century, the adopted policy position 
was probably as suitable to solve the defence problem as any other.  The feasibility and affordability 
of its force design were certainly matters of concern, but policy publications consequently provided 
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potential management solutions to these problems.  Following on this mandate, the defence force 
should have been able to derive — and implement — a force development strategy that is at least 
internally consistent with the demands of policy, if not effective in satisfying the needs of the 
external, changing security environment.  However, this study has maintained from the beginning 
that military effectiveness is as much a specific, overarching policy objective for the SANDF, as it is a 
general requirement for any other military’s performance — and therefore a valid yardstick to assess 
any military by, always conditional upon the consideration of context.  Consequently, one may then 
also view a military’s capabilities as policy-driven outcomes towards the achievement of 
effectiveness, adjusted to account for the influences of the external environment.  This study was 
therefore able to employ Brooks and Stanley’s framework for military effectiveness, being a common 
denominator of both policy and capabilities, to describe the delta between South African defence 
policy publications, the actual capabilities of the SANDF, and the real demands of the South African 
security environment (the latter to an admittedly lesser extent).  As with the study as a whole, the 
following conclusions are therefore organised in terms of the generic effectiveness attributes of 
integration, skill, quality, and responsiveness.   
 
3.1 On Organizational Coherence, Proficiency, and Material Superiority 
 
Insofar as the SANDF’s integration is concerned, the study has argued that the armed forces have 
struggled to correlate their actual force development activities with the declared defence policy 
position, especially during the last decade.  This has been more true for the SA Army than it had been 
for the other services, since the latter forces had received the modernisation benefit of the SDP 
packages,379 they are better aligned with the execution of the SANDF’s ‘primary function’, and (for 
the SA Navy, until recently) they have had a lesser role to play in fulfilling the immediate security 
demands of peace support operations, border control and internal stabilisation operations than the 
SA Army did.  While the internal activities within the SA Navy and the SA Air Force appeared to be 
mutually reinforcing to a large extent, the unity of purpose between the main thrust of the SA Army’s 
force development activities and the execution of its current- and predicted functions has steadily 
deteriorated.  Ultimately, though, none of the services can escape the effects of the discrepancy 
between declared defence policy outcomes, government’s expectations of real defence outputs, and 
the resource allocation to the DOD:  the dichotomy not only prohibits the integration of effort within 
the services, but also among them. 
 
Adding to these incongruent military-strategic considerations is a more recent emphasis on the 
SANDF’s role in improving the socio-economic conditions of the population at large, for example 
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  Ironically, the Army’s lack of inventory modernization may yet result in it suffering less 
organizational stress ― financially, doctrinally, and especially culturally ― than the other 
divisions, if the SANDF had to adopt an entirely different force development strategy,.   
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through community service programmes, the national youth service, or simply ’job creation’.  It has 
been hard enough for the SANDF to balance the contradictions between defence policy theory and 
national security practice, but with a direct commitment towards human security mixed into its force 
development strategy, a prognosis for the military’s improved integration becomes immeasurably 
worse.  By having three distinct areas of focus (viz the primary function in terms of its policy 
mandate, the current set of missions that it is committed to, and socio-economic initiatives that 
political authority demands), the SANDF is neither able to attain strategic consistency in its 
conceptual vision for the future, nor in its operational activities such as armaments acquisition 
projects, doctrinal development, or joint systems employment.  The study therefore concludes that 
the SANDF is deficient in integration, becoming worse to the same extent that defence policy’s 
obsolescence increases.   
 
Moving on to the issue of skill, the study has produced ample evidence of the SANDF’s competency 
― or the lack of it ― in executing its designated tasks and meeting its ordered commitments.  
Although hamstrung by a dearth of serviceable equipment and funds for the conduct of intensive 
training exercises, the SANDF still appears to have sufficient capacity for the inculcation of on-the-job 
proficiency through education, training, and personnel development.  In the absence of evidence to 
the contrary (probably only obtainable from contact with an enemy), the armed forces seem quite 
capable of assimilating the new technologies acquired through the SDP packages.  Still, a submission 
that the SANDF appears to be skilful enough in its current operational context does not automatically 
suggest that the competencies of the organization are in alignment with the ambitions of defence 
policy.  Whereas the attributes of integration and responsiveness are generic in nature, that of skill 
has a particular meaning for a military aspiring to develop a ‘modern system’:  it associates positively 
with intensive training and long-term service, designed to develop an institutional culture that 
favours military effectiveness, strong group cohesion, and unwavering fortitude under enemy fire.  
From its preceding arguments, the study has inferred that the SANDF may be deficient in all of these 
qualities, and therefore unable to conduct the ‘western way of war’ as defence policy evidently 
demands — a deduction that, given the gravity of its implications, begs further validation.  
 
While the qualities of integration, responsiveness and skill could be equally applicable to any 
effective military, whether considered a ‘modern system’ or not, Parker contends that the idealised 
aim of western strategy has always been the total annihilation of the enemy’s armed forces:  a 
Clausewitzian maxim that is not only in opposition to the values of many other cultures, but also 
anathema to the approach required for the successful waging of (for example) revolutionary warfare, 
peace support campaigns, and internal stabilisation operations.  Consequently, the organizational 
ethos of an SANDF that is being prepared to defeat a foreign aggressor ― the armed forces’ primary 
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function, according to policy ― would be antithetical to that which is required for the execution of 
the defence force’s current operations, and also contrary to defence policy’s insistence on a human 
rights culture for the military.  Oddly enough, this internal inconsistency allows the study to conclude 
that the convergence between the letter of defence policy, the SANDF’s prevailing force 
development outcomes, and its current operational tasks is actually reasonably good.  The same 
does not appear to hold true for the quality of the defence force’s material inventory, though.   
 
The attribute of quality relates to the technology and equipment that the military is using, or has 
access to, when it employs forces in operations.  As with a military’s skill, this particular element 
connotes positively with the ‘modern system’ ― so powerfully, in fact, that some analysts consider 
technology to be the primary motive underlying the construct’s development.  Defence policy’s 
insistence on the development of a balanced, modern, and technologically advanced SANDF is 
therefore a prime indicator of its aspirations towards a modern military system.  It is also after 
considering the quality of the armed forces that the study found the SANDF largely derelict in 
complying with the demands of the 1996 and 1998 defence policy publications:  not by any stretch of 
the imagination could the combat services (and especially the SA Army) be called ‘modern systems’, 
as Biddle and Parker conceptualised it.  As a matter of fact, the subtext of the 2012 Defence Review 
gives reason to suspect a regression in military effectiveness since defence policy was published, and 
suggests doubt as to whether the SANDF, in its present condition, would be able to defend the 
country against any determined military invasion at all (which is admittedly a very remote possibility, 
but a national policy imperative nonetheless). 
 
Whereas the South African citizenry may draw some comfort from the implausibility of the principal 
contingency that defence policy caters for, the study continuous to conclude that the armed forces 
do not even have access to the type and numbers of equipment required for the execution of its 
present tasks.  Regardless of the DOD’s confirmation that increased defence commitments, the costly 
integration of SDP equipment, and the real decrease in the defence budget allocation caused this 
state of affairs, the fact seems to be that the SANDF has failed to ensure the sustainability of the 
capabilities that it has either chosen to retain from the Cold War dispensation, or elected to acquire 
since then (yet another policy imperative).  Concluding on the quality of defence material, the study 
therefore judges the SANDF to be largely in contravention of the spirit of defence policy, which 
envisages the development of a modern military system; also, potentially at variance with the 
military’s constitutional obligation, and certainly deficient in meeting the needs of current 
operations.  One definitive attribute of effective militaries remain for the study to render a verdict 
on, though — a characteristic that, had the SANDF displayed it consistently since the publication of 
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defence policy (and as, indeed, the very same policy demands it), could still have resulted in an 
effective military.  This is the element of responsiveness.   
 
3.2 Regarding Appropriate Adaptations to the Environment 
 
After achieving its first objective of integrating statutory and non-statutory forces into a single entity, 
the SANDF was supposed to have turned its focus towards the development of the type of defence 
visualised by defence policy (and attempted by the SA Army after 2006, for example):  one motivated 
not only by the implausible contingency of a military invasion from abroad, but also bent upon 
solving the realistic security problems of the day.  In compliance with defence policy’s demand for 
regular review, the armed forces should have been able to revise its strategy by then, shifting its 
attention away from its preceding internal, structural focus, so as to provide for defence policy’s 
military-strategic objectives as well.  Initially, the demands on military effectiveness were few in 
number and discretionary in nature, allowing government to employ some of the SANDF forces in 
secondary tasks (peace support operations), but largely withdrawing them from others (border 
control and support to the SAPS).  While the time therefore seemed to be right for the next phase in 
defence force’s evolution, as mandated by policy publications, such a reformation would be largely 
dependent upon the ambition and vision of defence’s political- and military leadership. 
 
From the available evidence, though, the study has concluded that there has been (and possibly still 
is) at least two competing philosophies that guide defence policymakers:  one that finds expression 
in revolutionary war and people’s war, and one that espouses conventional-, regular- and manoeuvre 
warfare.  Adherents of the former theory, ascendant in both government and the armed forces, had 
their ambitions realized by the middle of the first decade after democratization, when the SANDF 
had attained the retrospective objectives of defence policy.  This group had spent its philosophical 
and ideological momentum.  One cannot say the same of the grouping that strove for the 
development of a modern military system, though.  Their gratification remained in abeyance in spite 
of a clear policy mandate to this effect, for reasons that the study has elaborated upon at some 
length.  Since the governing elites were unconvinced of the western way of war’s value from the 
start, the political will to embrace a modern military system would always have been lacking anyway.  
Furthermore, its implementation was tempered by the psychological effects of at least two other 
factors:  the establishment of a regional, collective security regime, which argues against self-
sufficiency in national defence, and the fact that a regular war — or any other military threat against 
South African interests, for that matter — seemed as remote then, as it does in the present (which, 
incidentally, allows collective defence to remain an untested concept, and therefore an objectively 
viable military option). 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Conclusion 
- 85 - 
In practice, government also had to weigh any real increase in the defence budget against society’s 
growing demands on those ministries that deal with human security issues, such as the departments 
of health, welfare, education, and police services.  Government is simply facing too many domestic 
concerns that vie for attention — issues that are simultaneously more urgent and more important 
than a national defence force’s requirements for (very expensive) capabilities to either fight 
implausible wars, or to conduct discretionary military missions with.  As for the SANDF itself, it has — 
in spite of policy demands to the contrary, and with its ever-dwindling capabilities clearly visible for 
all to see — remained largely unresponsive to both its resource constraints and its external 
operational environment.  The SA Army’s Vision 2020 initiative (arriving eight years after the 1998 
Defence Review’s publication, at a time when defence policy was already overdue for adjustment) is 
a case study of one service’s response to the changed security context:  while favouring the 
development of a modern military system in theory, it fails to reflect the practical implications of a 
budget that is inadequate to even sustain the SA Army’s capabilities in their present condition.   
 
4. Final Conclusion 
 
The South African government has, since the publication of the 1998 Defence Review, neither 
produced a coherent national security strategy, nor an updated and relevant defence policy that 
could serve to guide the development of the SANDF.  After achieving its initial objectives (integration, 
transformation, and withdrawal from domestic security), the defence force was consequently left 
with a policy vision of its future that was not only discordant with the global revolution in strategic 
affairs, but also with the national revolution in security affairs:  effectively, a policy vacuum in which 
the SANDF has had to find its own way.  The security risks accompanying government’s dereliction 
were manageable, since no military threats seemed to be forthcoming, and the state has entered 
into collective defence agreements with other countries anyway.  However, it is by no means certain 
that an SANDF left to its own strategic devices will be effective when called upon to execute its 
constitutional mandate.  In fact, the study has rendered a description of a delta between the 
demands of South African defence policy, the military capabilities of the SANDF, and the challenges 
of South Africa’s security context that appears not only to be uncomfortably large, but is also growing 
with the passage of time.  At the deepest level, the condition seems to originate from the fact that 
SANDF is constituted from exponents of two incompatible, but equally valid philosophies — those 
advocating a modern military system, and those schooled in revolutionary war — that have, through 
the existence of a permissive military-strategic environment, been allowed to coexist and remain 
unresolved.  The SANDF has therefore been unable to develop military capabilities that satisfy either 
the desired outcomes of defence policy publications, or that comply with the contemporary demands 
of the national security environment.  With an insolvent defence policy lately appearing to coincide 
with financial bankruptcy, the SANDF may just be heading for a perfect storm.   
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Perspectives on International Relations Theory 
 
Model 
Component 
Idealism Realism Behavioralism Neoliberalism 
 
Core Concern 
 
Institutionalizing 
peace 
 
War and security  
 
Discovering through 
science “laws” about 
the causes and 
consequences of 
interstate interaction 
 
Fostering interstate 
cooperation on the 
globe’s shared 
economic, social, and 
ecological problems 
Submodel(s) International law; 
international 
organization; 
democratization 
Neorealism; 
structural realism 
Comparative study of 
foreign policy; 
quantitative analysis 
Complex 
interdependence; 
regimes; feminist theory 
Outlook on 
Global Prospects 
Optimistic; 
progress 
Pessimistic; 
stability 
Progress through 
reason 
Expectations of 
cooperation; creation of 
a global community 
Key Units Institutions 
transcending 
nations 
Independent 
nation-states 
Individuals, states, and 
the international 
system 
Individuals; 
“penetrated” nations 
and non-state 
transnational actors 
Motives of 
Actors 
Collaboration; 
mutual aid; 
meeting human 
needs 
National 
interests; zero-
sum competition; 
security; power 
Rational choice, as 
modified by 
environmental 
opportunities and 
constraints 
National interests; 
justice; peace and 
prosperity; liberty; 
morality 
Central Concepts Collective security; 
world order; law; 
integration; 
international 
organization 
Structural 
anarchy; power; 
national interests; 
balance of power; 
polarity 
Theory building and 
hypothesis testing 
against reproducible 
evidence and 
deductive modeling 
Transnational relations; 
law; free markets; 
interdependence; 
integration; liberal 
republican rule; human 
rights; gender 
Prescriptions Institutional reform Increase national 
power; resist 
reduction of 
national 
autonomy 
Policy advice grounded 
on verifiable 
knowledge 
Develop regimes; 
promote democracy and 
international 
institutions; coordinate 
collective responses to 
diverse global problems 
 
Source:  Kegley, C.W. (Jr) and Wittkopf, E.R. 1995.  World Politics:  Trend and Transformation (Fifth Edition).  
New York, St. Martin’s Press p 37 
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Budgetary Considerations 
 
1. Defence Budget as a Percentage of GDP 
 
 
2. Recent Defence Allocations 
 
 
 
Source:  Republic of South Africa 2012.  South African Defence Review 2012 (Consultative Draft).  Department of 
Defence, pp 89 and 90 (available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=163570) 
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